

becoming an increasingly important focus of East-West relations. However, it should be emphasized that this importance stems from strategic considerations. Non-military Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union has little impact on the course of East-West relations. On the other hand, if this dialogue and cooperation contribute toward a climate which is conducive to the discussion of strategic issues such as Arctic arms control and confidence- building measures then so much the better.²⁰ At the same time, one should be realistic about such possibilities and not ascribe to this cooperation an impact far beyond its potential.

There are of course areas where non-military and military issues will conflict. For example, potential economic cooperation in Soviet offshore oil development in the Barents Sea may be restricted by Soviet strategic concerns. Where such conflicts occur, Arctic cooperation will be a more visible component of East-West relations. However, in general terms, Soviet participation in areas of Arctic cooperation such as science and the environment should not raise concerns or create any problems in the realm of military/strategic relations with our NATO allies. Most important, it should not have any significant effect on our bilateral relations with the United States.

The one area of non-military cooperation with the Soviet Union which could create friction in Canada-US relations relates to jurisdiction over Arctic archipelagic waters. However, there is little likelihood that a bilateral agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union would mention this subject. Both countries have drawn straight baselines around their respective Arctic archipelagos, thereby designating the enclosed waters as internal. The Soviet Union has already publicly acknowledged its agreement with Canada's decision to do this. This topic should not emerge as a factor in Canadian-Soviet bilateral relations.

In keeping with its priorities in Arctic policy, which include the development of international links, the United States is currently as likely as not to encourage Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation, particularly in those areas where the United States has direct concerns, such as the Arctic environment. To illustrate the extent of current American interest in this area, issues related to US-Soviet Arctic cooperation were on the agenda during the Reagan-Gorbachev Washington summit of December 1987.²¹ This led to two agreements on Arctic relations contained in the communiqué of the Moscow summit in May/June 1988. The United States also participated at the recent meetings in Stockholm concerning the establishment of an International Arctic Science Agreement. It is not unlikely that in the near future Canada may even begin to lag behind the United States in terms of pursuing new initiatives for Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, little to be concerned about in terms of any potentially adverse effect Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation may have on Canadian-US relations.

CONCLUSION

There are two new dimensions in Canadian-Soviet Arctic relations. First, the signing of the programme of scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and other initiatives in bilateral Arctic cooperation have tended to focus more attention on the Arctic as a theatre of scientific, environmental, cultural and economic cooperation. This has broadened the international aspects of Arctic development from the traditional military strategic arena to include relations in the non-military sphere. This development has created some new challenges for Canadian foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.

The Soviet approach of combining military issues and non-military aspects of Arctic cooperation can be counter-productive. For the Canadian government, it would be more sensible to address these two issues separately. If viewed in a parallel way, lack of progress in the military/strategic arena will not impede potential cooperation in non-military areas. Although each set of relations would not proceed in a vacuum, the two should not be directly linked. This of course presupposes a continuation of East-West relations along the current line of attempts to reduce tensions.

Another reason for making this distinction is to help clarify the needs and priorities of Canadian foreign policy in this area. The federal government has a responsibility to create a climate wherein northerners can pursue their social, cultural and economic development through the forging of international links. Programmes of cooperation should be concluded with whichever circumpolar country offers the greatest potential benefits. The specific areas of cooperation should be developed with individual countries in a way which reflects our national interest, the formulation of which should incorporate a strong input from northerners. In science, for example, the most important areas for cooperation should first be set thematically and ranked in terms of national priorities. Only then should approaches be made to those countries which would provide the most advantageous relationship in those targeted areas. This process should be replicated in other fields of potential cooperation such as education and commerce. In the cultural sphere, ethnic affinity would be an important determinant in establishing international exchanges.

By not linking it with issues such as Arctic arms control and demilitarization, Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union can be viewed in a more realistic perspective. Specific actions such as Canada's decision to upgrade its defence capability in the Arctic, including the acquisition of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines over the next twenty years, should not have any repercussions on Canadian-Soviet scientific or cultural cooperation in the Arctic. In the longer run, this approach may even prove to be more beneficial with respect to strategic considerations in that it can create a more conducive climate for negotiations in areas such as Arctic arms control.

From the development of Arctic relations with the