

attention to Grenadian affairs in contrast to their interest in Nicaragua, and, when speaking of them, avoided such explicit embraces of Grenada. To cite an example, one of the few articles in *Latinskaya Amerika* dealing with the Grenadian question during Bishop's tenure in office referred to Grenada not as a state of socialist orientation, but as a state undergoing a "democratic anti-imperialist revolution".⁹⁴ The reason for this is that in Soviet eyes, such terminology carries with it a degree of economic and military commitment, given the purported irreversibility of the historical process. Jacobs, in his July 1983 letter, notes his suspicion that the Soviet Union was unwilling to undertake such commitments, in part out of a fear of provoking the United States and in part out of relative indifference towards this "small distant country".⁹⁵ This diffidence in theory was reflected in Soviet diplomatic practice. Jacobs noted with some frustration that Grenada was not treated as a part of the "inner circle" of the socialist community, while Grenadian representatives received treatment in the Soviet Union distinctly inferior to that accorded to representatives of other allied regimes, such as that of Nicaragua.⁹⁶

Soviet-Grenadian economic agreements display a Soviet unwillingness to underwrite Grenada's economic development. The Soviet failure to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, as in the case of Cuba, suggests that the parameters of Soviet willingness to assume risks in its relationship with Caribbean states were rather narrow. This is also suggested by the Soviet insistence that its military aid be channelled through Cuba.⁹⁷ The risk averse character of Soviet policy was confirmed in the Soviet response to the US invasion of Grenada, in which the rhetoric flowed with abandon,

⁹⁴ A. Fetisov, "Trudnosti i Nadezhdy Grenady", *Latinskaya Amerika* (1981), #1, p. 67.

⁹⁵ Jacobs, *op. cit.* (note 86), p. 200.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁹⁷ Although this suggests once again the utility of the USSR's Cuban connection in the implementation of Soviet policy in the region, it is not intended to give the impression here that Cuba acted as a Soviet "proxy" in the relationship with Grenada. It was, after all, Castro who first embraced the NJM regime and who assisted the Grenadians in the development of a relationship with the Soviet Union. Later events in Grenada displayed a certain degree of tension between the Soviet Union and Cuba. There is some indication that the Soviet Union favoured the Coard faction within the NJM and was not particularly unhappy about the unseating of Bishop in the fall of 1983. Castro, by contrast, adamantly condemned the coup and the subsequent murder of Bishop. This suggests once again that the conventional image of Cuba as a compliant tool of the Soviets in the region should be re-examined.