as soon as circumstances permitted. The communiqué specifically noted tha, o rec while recent Soviet actions seemed to rule out any movement for the time being on the question of mutual force reductions, NATO should pursue its study of the issues involved so that it would be in a position to move ahead when more favourable circumstances prevail. Canada attaches particular o this importance to this element of the discussion in Brussels. of Sov

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In conclusion, the ministers agreed that the North Atlantic Alliance would rather continue to stand as the guarantor of security and the essential foundation of European reconciliation. Recent events had further demonstrated that is Standi. continued existence was more than ever necessary.

In my statement to the North Atlantic Council, I said that, like others, me to we accepted that the threat to the alliance resulting from the Soviet invasion of o disc Czechoslovakia was an indirect one which faced NATO not with a problem over v of responding to premeditated aggression but rather of coping with the the Se uncertainty and the possibility of miscalculation which recent Soviet conduct had fostered. In view of this situation, we agreed that NATO's continuing meetin determination to resist any aggression directed against its members should be of the In spit made clear, as well as the fact that the alliance could not be expected to remain indifferent to any further moves which even indirectly threatened its security. this ce

While we accepted that it was natural in the existing circumstances to stress has led the defensive character of the alliance, we considered it was important that **t**hat po NATO should take advantage of all reasonable opportunities to resume the Canad dialogue with the Soviet Union and thus to promote in due course progress and, se toward the settlement of the issues facing Europe. We therefore supported the is to v view that NATO's policy should be to keep open the option of normal relations with the U.S.S.R. against the day when the Soviet Union itself would recognize followi that such a course was in its own best interest. We urged that the communiqué uncerta should clearly reaffirm the alliance's pursuit of détente, together with the In the achievement of arms-control and disarmament measures, as its long-tern pressin sufficie objectives.

we pro There is no doubt that, on the eve of the Brussels meeting, there was some concern on the part of the other members of the alliance regarding Canadas earmai support for NATO. The events in Czechoslovakia had caused them to appreciate Atlanti once again the value of NATO as a means of ensuring their security and they Canada were naturally anxious that nothing should be done, particularly at this time, to detract from the solidarity of the alliance. By the time the meeting was climate over I think we were able to satisfy our allies that we shared their concern about consult the future security of Europe; that, although we were reviewing our foreign and both a force of defence policy, we should continue to live up to our commitments to NATO until such time as they might be altered; and that, if, in the future, the pensate Government of Canada should consider changing our role in the alliance, we equipm should, of course, consult with them. small b

In summary, the Canadian delegation to the Brussels meeting endeavoured defence