

Government had learned that destroyers could be of assistance in U.N. operations for the defence of Korea and that appropriate action was being taken to place the three destroyers at present in the Western Pacific under General MacArthur's command. Mr. Lie would be requested to bring this decision to the attention of General MacArthur as soon as possible. A draft note to the Secretary General of the United Nations along the above lines was submitted and read.

2. Mr. Pearson said it was important to make clear that our contribution was in support of the United Nations only and that U.N. operations against Korea should not be confused with U.S. operations in other parts of the Far East, particularly with regard to Formosa, that our participation was limited to action under the U.N. resolution, and that the Canadian senior officer in the area maintained the right of direct access to his Government.

The President, in his initial statement, for internal reasons had linked action with regard to Formosa with action in Korea. The Peking Government had interpreted this as aggression against the Chinese State and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Russians were abetting them in this interpretation. The Chinese had in readiness 200,000 of their best troops for invasion of Formosa. It was unlikely that they would go through with this plan in view of the changed U.S. policy toward Formosa. However, alternatively they might consider employing all or part of these troops in Korea or Indo-China. While there was no indication at present that the U.S.S.R. was planning aggressive action in Europe, it seemed likely that extension of hostilities in Asia would be encouraged. The Russians would probably welcome any situation which would tie up Western forces without involving any Russian forces. Gromyko had requested an interview with the U.K. Ambassador in Moscow and had asked him if the United Kingdom had any proposals for bringing the war in Korea to an end. This might indicate that Russia was trying to capitalize on differences between the British and American positions in the Far East and to drive a wedge between the two countries. It might again mean a genuine anxiety on Russia's part to isolate hostilities, or it might be a cloak for further action planned by Russia or her allies.

001745

Privy Council Office
Bureau du Conseil privé

RG 2, A5a,
Vol. 2645

National Archives of Canada
Archives nationales du Canada