

previously obtained. Whenever possible, the scale of the military effort should be cut back as the need decreased.

5. MR. LYTTTELTON repeated the opinion that any action by the Canadian government, whether it were rationing or otherwise, would be doubly effective psychologically if taken before the Washington meeting, before the "crunch" came. It would be definitely helpful with U.S. authorities—one more case of giving twice by giving quickly.

6. MR. LLEWELLIN said that one of the most serious aspects of the situation was the threatened breakdown of the mechanism of the Combined Food Board. In the face of an overall shortage amounting to perhaps 1½ million tons of meat, of shortages in oils and fats and in sugar, the Combined Food Board had failed to cope with the problem.

There was a wide gap between the U.S. Army field ration (meat), which approximated that of the United Kingdom-Canada, and the amounts delivered to the Army, which ran at the rate of from 420 to 450 pounds per head per annum. It was hoped to find out what was happening to this large spread.

Prisoners of war scales, under existing interpretations of the Geneva Convention, were ridiculously high in contrast to those of civil populations of liberated countries and of the United Kingdom herself.

As to the United Kingdom, without help, they would face a cut in the meat ration in severe circumstances, which would widen even farther the disparity with other countries.

No meat allocations at all had been made by the Combined Food Board to France, Holland or Belgium. The French wanted to make their own contracts with the Argentine by exception to the general agreement under which the U.K. government were the sole meat contractors with that country. This, however, would have unfortunate effects upon price and control of distribution.

7. MR. LLEWELLIN spoke briefly of the position with respect to other foodstuffs:

Wheat was the only commodity in sufficient overall supply. The United Kingdom had diverted shipments of wheat and flour to Europe; her own minimum requirements were eight weeks' wheat and four weeks' flour.

The sugar position was complicated by Cuba's refusal to contract on a two-year basis.

Oils and fats were another great difficulty. U.K. stocks were running down sharply. An attempt was being made to obtain increased supplies of flax seed from the Argentine in return for coal. The United States were using substantially increased quantities of fats for soap; a reduction here would help.

Canned fish and all dairy products were also short.

8. MR. LLEWELLIN said that the principal immediate objective was to achieve genuine combined planning with the United States, to make reasonable and prompt allocations designed to meet best existing deficiencies. The United Kingdom had released from their stocks large quantities for the European countries. There was no more to be had from these sources.