

In *Smith v. Prosser*, [1907] 2 K. B., 746, Williams, L.J., speaking of *Young v. Grote*, and *Ingham v. Primrose*, in an off-hand way pronounces that they "have indeed now ceased to be law." Reference to pp. 1317 and 1340 of this treatise will demonstrate that neither case can thus lordly be dismissed in a parenthesis even by a Lord Justice.

Again there is another class of cases, like *Sheffield Corporation v. Barclay* (at p. 1354), or *Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated* (at p. 1355), which clinch discussions of some difficulty and suggest the expediency of rearranging the classification of a number of cases that they affect; this too I have endeavoured to do.

There has also been much new legislation to be embodied, some of it bringing into existence new aspects of law; as the series of Acts which have, for the time being, resulted in the Motor Car Act, 1903. Whether these are properly treated under the heading of Occupation of Property (at p. 438) may admit of reasonable dispute, but considerations of convenience led me to deal with them there.

Many new cases too have had to be grouped under the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (at p. 329), and have required detailed attention.

Then there were the topics which were so obviously imperfectly or confusedly dealt with in my last edition, that rewriting the portion relating to them was the only possible satisfactory way of treating them. This remedial process has been applied to the chapter on Corporations and Local Bodies, also to that on the Occupation of Property; while the chapters on Common Carriers by Water and on Collision on Water have been similarly transformed. The whole of Book VII. on Unclassified Relations has been rewritten. Of course, as the subject dealt with in the old and the new is the same, much of the difference that exists is only a difference of expression, and in many cases the old material has been used substantially unaltered where perhaps, even in my partial judgment, it is very capable of improvement; but with all deductions in these cases, what is now presented in this group is set forth for the first time.

There are other chapters, as for example that on Degrees of Negligence (a subject on which most lawyers are dogmatists), or the following chapter, on Limitations of Liability, which are altered, not so far as to affect their identity, but sufficiently to include a modifying amount of novelty.

Indeed the only chapter which is unaltered (except occasionally verbally) is that on the Duty to Answer for One's Own Acts, which is practically an examination of the grounds of the decision of *Stanley v. Powell*, that is introduced in a recent excellent and authoritative collection as a Leading Case. What a leading case means in this connection I cannot say; but in my opinion *Stanley v. Powell* is not an authority for anything, but was decided on quite wrong grounds; so I have left this chapter untouched.

To make room for the new matter considerable excisions and compressions have been made. Thus the discussion on *Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas*, which was spread over nine pages, is now confined to five; and this perhaps is still an excess in view of the recent trend of the authorities. *Woodley v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.*, which took eight pages, now occupies but two; and *Young v. Grote*, which was made to cover various discussions through twenty-seven pages,