

*External Affairs*

known by now, is as follows. I am quoting from Mr. Dulles' speech made in New York on January 12:

... before military planning can be changed the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions.

Then he went on:

This has been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.

Some weeks afterwards the vice-president of the United States spoke over the air on March 14 and said more or less the same thing. I quote:

Rather than let the communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose.

From Mr. Dulles' speech, from which I have already quoted, I picked three words which I considered as being of special importance. These words were "instantly" . . . "means" . . . "our choosing". When I spoke to Mr. Dulles in Washington last week about his speech he said that he did not quarrel with my selection of words, as they were indeed key words. But he was of the opinion that I had excluded the most important word. That word was "capacity". Dealing with that point on March 17 at his press conference Mr. Dulles said:

If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated there was a "capacity" to retaliate instantly. In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly under conditions that call for that. The essential thing is to have the capacity to retaliate instantly.

I certainly accept the importance of that word, but I would suggest that the word "capacity" means not only military capacity but political capacity and that, as Mr. Dulles pointed out so clearly in his article in *Foreign Affairs*, includes the necessity of co-operation with other countries, especially in such things as the use of bases.

Mr. Dulles has pointed out, as did President Eisenhower in his address to the United Nations, and this has also been emphasized by the Canadian delegation to the United Nations assembly, that this aspect of the question, namely collective capacity and facilities, is in fact a safeguard against rash or provocative action, if such safeguard were needed, on the part of any member of the coalition. For action could only be taken by a joint or collective agreement.

There is a second word to which I devoted some attention in my Washington speech, and that was the word "instantly". That word, in connection with the strategy we are

discussing, involves no problem, as I see it, if there is a direct attack on your own territory, or indeed possibly on the territory of your neighbour, because then it becomes a question of self-preservation and quick, effective, and instant action is essential and would be taken by any country attacked. No one, I believe, would take exception to that.

But the situation is not always so clear as that, and not always so urgent. Sometimes we have cases of unclear or indirect aggression where the circumstances may be blurred and decisions cannot be so easily and quickly made. In that kind of situation a question at once arises as to the application of this doctrine. Against whom will the retaliation be made? Where, how, and when? The difficulty of course in getting out of that situation is that you cannot find any cut-and-dried formula to cover all these cases, and if you did have one you would not want to give it away by unnecessary publicity. Yet, having regard to that difficulty, there is the other difficulty, because this kind of blurred situation is exactly when co-operation and consultation with your friends is most essential and when it is of vital importance to act together as much as we can and plan as far in advance as possible.

Then there is the phrase "by means". That has been interpreted in certain quarters, and understandably so, to give some weight to the fear that the application of this kind of strategy might involuntarily convert small wars into a world war. The Secretary of State of the United States has been trying to clear up that misapprehension in recent days by emphasizing that "means" do not include any single means, let alone atomic means, that the means would have to be adapted to the circumstances and that there would be many occasions—indeed probably most occasions, even of aggression—when it would be unwise politically and strategically to use atomic means at all. Then there is this final word "our choice". Of course there were some worries about the interpretation of that word "our". Those who worried felt that they had some cause to do so because of the ambiguity of the language that was used and because it was felt—I think rightly—that if collective security is to work, the word "our" in that context must mean the free world coalition. Mr. Dulles, in his *Foreign Affairs* article to which I have already referred, agreed with this interpretation when he wrote:

The main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at a place of its own choice.