

cause (as a glance at the economic status of the 11 September hijackers reveals). Far better, said Mr. Schaper, would be simply to conceive of terrorism as a "phenomenon in and of itself."

Mr. Schaper stated that America had a central role to play in the security of Europe, a fact that was widely acknowledged on the part of European officials, not least because American involvement "allows for" purely European cooperation within a wider compass than might be the case in the absence of such involvement. By contrast, the UN had an extremely limited role in European security, something that was unlikely to change. What was worrisome from the Dutch perspective was the huge disparity within Europe between the greater and the lesser powers. Institutional structures (i.e., NATO and the EU) provided the Netherlands with a "seat at the table," something that could not be said for the UN. However, recent talk within the EU of bestowing greater leadership functions upon a three-power "directory" was disturbing, from the Dutch perspective.

From the above analysis, Mr. Schaper inferred a set of four political objectives for his country: 1) maintain the transatlantic link; 2) support the process of European supranational integration; 3) spread democracy and prosperity to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); and 4) manage conflict in the Balkans. In respect of the latter, he noted that few would have expected, a decade ago, that the Netherlands would be deploying thousands of troops in the former Yugoslavia. By the same token, even more recently few would have imagined that the Netherlands would be sending hundreds of soldiers to Afghanistan.

In the realm of defence policy, Mr. Schaper was guardedly optimistic about the prospects of ESDP: "I'm not saying it is successful, merely that it has been making progress." An encouraging development has been the growing pragmatism of France vis-à-vis the alliance, reflective of a recognition in Paris that NATO was the "only game in town." For the Dutch, security priorities could be listed in the following order: 1) enhance the EU's military capability so as to avoid a "Potemkin-village" model; 2) foster closer EU-NATO collaboration; 3) find some means of bringing NATO members, including Canada, more explicitly into the picture as concerns EU-NATO collaboration; 4) develop the EU's crisis management capabilities in the nonmilitary aspects of security; and 5) reform the institutions of the EU itself to make it capable of responding to new challenges.

Turning to the important issue of increasing military capabilities, Mr. Schaper's previously stated guarded optimism shifted to outright pessimism. For all its rhetorical promise, ESDP continued to experience a "disappointing reaction" from European governments unwilling to allocate more resources to defence, or even to reform their