

Third, there is China. Unless Beijing can be brought into the security equation as an active and willing participant, it will be very difficult to make concrete gains. However, China is even larger than India, is more self-sufficient in terms of energy, production and military technology, is ruled by a hard-line government, is expanding its role as a regional hegemon, and is even less susceptible to external pressure than is India. US interest in the Chinese security threat is limited largely to other parts of the region. The fact is that there are no levers or fulcrums big enough to move China, and China lies at the heart of much of the Asian nuclear equation.

Complicating the calculus is the fact that much international credibility has been lost through ill-considered or uneven application of "carrots" and "sticks" to these security questions. The American tendency to treat Islamic nationalism, however benign, as fundamentally bad while remaining more or less indifferent to Hindu nationalism likewise sends negative signals. The pervasive Western distaste for military governments, regardless of the popular support those governments enjoy and the character of the regimes they replace, further erodes credibility; and the continued reliance of all Western nations upon American (and British, and French) nuclear forces for their deterrent value, while decrying similar attitudes in developing states, does not help.

## **Diplomacy**

There are some further thoughts on what might be done. International diplomacy offers a number of options of varying utility. Foremost among these is the traditional offer of "good offices" to broker discussions between Islamabad and New Delhi. The ability of the international community to offer good offices could be crucial in combination with other initiatives. While this proved unnecessary in any direct way in the Latin American context, there may be room for it in South Asia. And even in Latin America the indirect role of other states was real.

A second diplomatic option is assistance with developing confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). These have been very present in Latin America and have been wide ranging and inventive in the Brazil-Argentine case. Indeed, the nuclear cooperation put into place was considered as a CSBM for the two countries. These measures fall into two categories: diplomatic, and technical. Diplomatic CSBMs include the establishment of regular political- and military-level staff talks and consultations, senior and working-level military and technical exchanges, regular conferences on strategic issues and a variety of potential agreements ranging from joint crisis consultation to the establishment of a "hot line".

Other diplomatic options, not used in Latin America but which were discussed, involve attempts to establish dispute resolution mechanisms aimed at mitigating the Kashmir conflict (a complex and high-risk option with limited chance of success, but with an enormous potential payoff), and the establishment of bilateral or multilateral talks aimed at achieving the same goals. The difficulty with these options is that while increasing the number of participants tends to decrease costs, diffuse the responsibility for and consequences of failure, and decrease risks, it also prolongs the process, introduces linkages and reduces the probability of near- or mid-term success.