

and France) have been used as a basis for a wider testing regime, most notably the efforts to institute a CTBT.⁴

With the LTBT in place, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 broadened the non-nuclear regime to include possession of weapons. The NPT created a decidedly asymmetrical system of possessor and non-possessor states.⁵ It was intended to address "horizontal" proliferation by prohibiting new states from acquiring nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment amongst established nuclear powers to seek an end to the nuclear arms race, and ultimate nuclear disarmament.⁶ The NPT outlined the test ban goal, as well: "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."⁷ The May 1995 NPT renewal conference meetings in New York ended in a decision to extend the treaty indefinitely into the future. In addition, largely as a result of United States pressure, the possessing states agreed to seek a CTBT and pledged to continue reducing warheads with an intention to eliminate them completely.⁸

⁴Others have suggested a middle-ground approach. Jozef Goldblat and David Cox, for example, proposed a Very Low Threshold Test Ban (VLTTB) of not more than 5 kilotonnes as a "meaningful alternative" to the CTBT. The LTBT spurred the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the U.S. and USSR limiting underground tests, as well as the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET—also between the U.S. and USSR) regulating nuclear explosions outside regular weapons tests. Goldblat and Cox, ed., Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation? (Stockholm: SIPRI in association with Oxford University Press, 1991).

⁵ The NPT grew out of a 1961 United Nations General Assembly resolution to pursue a treaty governing the acquisition and proliferation of nuclear arms. In some cases, the 1968 Treaty has also required states with purely civilian programs to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, created in 1957, to inspect their nuclear programmes. The NPT allowed for continuing development of civilian nuclear power programmes.

⁶"Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament," Preamble, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (729 UNTS 161); EIF March 5, 1970.

⁷"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 1 July 1968; Entered into force: 5 March 1970.

⁸The NPT Extension Review Conference adopted a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, but was not able to adopt a Final Declaration. The Principles and Objectives included decisions regarding non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and increased resources for the IAEA. See Berhanykun Andemicael, Merle Opelz, and Jan Priest, "Measure for Measure: The NPT and the Road Ahead," IAEA Bulletin, 37 (September 1995), 33.