

- (c) giving developing countries greater flexibility to use trade restrictions to promote infant industrial development, particularly key industries that would spur further industrialization, to address balance of payments issues (which they would be more likely to face), and more generally to “turn the international terms of trade ... in [their] favour.”

It is always instructive to look to the “dog that didn’t bark.” With average tariffs still fairly high at the time and many other issues to be addressed, the long hiatus in significant forward movement on trade policy is not easy to explain.

As well, the fact that two of the Haberler recommendations, trade in agriculture and developing country issues, are still featured prominently in the just-launched Doha Round is silent testimony to the witch’s brew that these two issues have constituted for trade policy over the many decades since Gottfried Haberler and his co-panellists issued their report.¹⁵

By the same token, the fact that the Haberler Report agenda was firmly engaged in the Kennedy Round suggests that circumstances had changed to end the hiatus of the late 1950s

¹⁵ It is interesting to recall here why agriculture was largely excluded from the original GATT. As Philip Trezise notes: “When GATT was written in 1947, it was recognizably an American document, drawn in substance and to a considerable extent in language from drafts written in the Department of State for the commercial policy chapter of the proposed International Trade Organization. The provisions for agricultural trade substantially exempted from GATT discipline the U.S. farm programs inherited from the New Deal. Article XI, the prohibition of import quotas, does not apply to agricultural commodities subject to production or marketing controls. Article XVI, which frowns on trade-distorting subsidies in general, allows export subsidies on primary products, with the vague injunction that such subsidies capture no more than an ‘equitable’ share of trade. These openings were widened in 1955 when Congress forced the Eisenhower administration to obtain a sweeping waiver of GATT rules for any article produced under a U.S. farm program.” See Philip H. Trezise, “The Uruguay Round: High Hopes, Hard Realities, and Unfinished Business,” Brookings Institution. Volume 14, Number 1, Winter 1991. The difficulties in advancing agricultural sector liberalization may to some extent flow from this “original sin” on the part of the prime mover of the original GATT.