

The security procedures used to protect information within the Agency should also be examined. Agency personnel are directed not to reveal information they have received through their duties. However, Agency staffers may sometimes have contacts with the missions of their home states.³ If difficulties have arisen through these or other contacts, they have either been fairly minor or kept from public knowledge. Such contacts might play a helpful role, for example in bringing earlier pressure to bear on a state to account for anomalies. On a more routine level, they can give states a better sense of how the Agency works, and thus increase their ability to evaluate its assurances accurately. But the potential for abuses which could seriously threaten the Agency is quite obvious. While some "informal transparency" could have advantages, good security procedures, staff loyalty, strong upper-level management and the willingness of states to refrain from destructive exploitation are all required.

Reports on inspections are normally only forwarded to the inspected state. In its public statements and published materials, the Agency gives only limited information concerning its findings or the nuclear activities of the states subject to its activities. Safeguards Implementation Reports, which assess the working of the safeguards systems, may give more information, but are considered confidential. This tight control over information has caused complaints by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it does not have sufficient information to evaluate Agency safeguards and assurances. Possibly more information could be released, with the effect of enhancing the credibility of the Agency's assurances. On the other hand, some information could readily be misunderstood or exploited for political (as well as commercial) purposes by states or by private parties, and the Agency's credibility could be undeservedly injured in the process. This was one reason for keeping the Safeguards Implementation Reports confidential.⁴ Nonetheless, both the dissatisfaction with the information released by the Agency and the problems which improved access might cause should be noted as one area of possible study with respect to a chemical weapons verification agency.

Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors

The Agency's inspectors enjoy certain privileges and immunities in order to permit their effective functioning. These are covered in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, as well as in specific safeguards agreements. They include personal immunities, protection of baggage and communications, and the use of the UN *laissez-passer*. While inspectors may be expelled from a state, expulsions should occur only after consultations between the Director General and the Foreign Minister, and only for cases of abuse, not for official acts.