

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The other approach, which is not ours, is that of extending verification to all chemical industries, which would, in our view, be unpracticable and could most adversely affect the economic activities of States.

This has been only further proved to us by the Working Papers of the United Kingdom (CD/514 and CD/575) which reveal under close scrutiny that their authors would like to make hundreds and even thousands of different chemicals subject to all kinds of rigorous monitoring, which would be all-embracing rather than focused on the most dangerous technological stages of production. Now is this actually feasible?

One might properly ask what would be less burdening for the chemical industry -- a certain number of reasonable restrictions or an expensive across-the-board monitoring whose implications for the economic and other interests of States might prove to be far from benign?

Another question which demands a very cautious, balanced and responsible approach is that of the elimination, dismantling or conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities. Everyone will probably agree that toxic chemicals, including ones intended for chemical-weapon purposes, are obtained in the chemical industry as a result of several production stages, each having a different technological set up. One of these is the final technological stage in the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals or key components of binary systems. What, then, should be the object of practical interest from the viewpoint of drawing up the convention? Should the entire facility be eliminated, or would it be more appropriate to eliminate only the part responsible for the final technological stage? The answer to this seems obvious.

The reluctance of certain negotiating parties to accommodate the positions of others and the desire to impose one's own unilateral approach explain why the question of destroying chemical-weapon stockpiles has not yet been resolved at the negotiations. The main thing that remains to be done here is, in our view, to agree on a procedure for destroying the stockpiles of chemical weapons that would not offer unilateral military advantages to anyone at any stage of the destruction. We are prepared to examine all kinds of proposals submitted during the negotiations, including the working proposal by one of the delegations to alternate the destruction of the more dangerous weapon stockpiles with that of less dangerous weapons, thereby taking account of such factors as the increase in mutual trust between States as stocks are destroyed, the capacity maintained during that time for adequate reaction to possible convention violations by parties or non-parties, and so forth.

Throughout the long history of international negotiations, the partners in any talks have first established agreed baselines and criteria and only then proceeded to formulating specific definitions on their basis. This has also been the case with the talks on banning chemical weapons. Toxicity criteria have been defined with utmost precision on the basis of objective factors, a tentative