

The attempt to construct a metaphysic out of psychology is not a whit more promising. For the world to which we are there introduced consists of the experiences of particular minds. The psychologist's task is to seek out the laws to which such experiences conform. But while an idea is for him nothing but a fact in the mental life of an individual it is for metaphysical purposes much more. It has not only a content but a reference. "A consciousness of green is not a green consciousness." A world within over against a world without is as much a postulate of psychology as a postulate of chemistry; in some sense or other it is an ultimate deliverance of thought upon experience, and it is a task of metaphysics to inquire *in what sense precisely* this dualism is to be construed. But the psychologist who argues that the real world is nothing but bundles of sense-experiences gluing themselves together by inscrutable laws of association is using his science to subvert that principle which the methods of his science have taken for granted. So far I am entirely in agreement with the protests which are being raised by the so-called "New Realists." They quite rightly object to the practice of "dealing with knowledge as if it amounted only to a systematic connexion of mental phenomena"; but I cannot agree that because some psychologists have thus transgressed the limits of their science, we should return to the barren psychology of a bygone age. Much harm may have been done, but it is not beyond repair. The intrusion of the methods of one study upon some other study to which they are inapplicable does not injure merely that study upon which the intrusion is committed. There is an inevitable reaction upon the methods themselves; when their limits are forgotten their