

Both countries acted out of their own national security interests, and these interests had much in common. The main reason on the part of the United States was the threat of the loss of control over FSU nuclear weapons, in this case TNW, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The danger of the emergence of a number of new nuclear states on the territory of the FSU was also a great concern to Moscow. For that reason, Gorbachev immediately reacted to the U.S. initiative by assuming obligations in respect to the FSU TNW.<sup>30</sup> Through these initiatives, dividing TNW among the former Union republics was avoided, although the actions were not without costs, particularly to the Russians due to lack of policy coordination among several ministries, limitations on storage, space, and transportation facilities, violations of safety rules, and serious financial concerns, including the withdrawal of forces and provisions for military personnel.<sup>31</sup> Some Russian analysts have proposed formal agreements, including information exchanges, schedules, and U.S. financial support to supplement the unilateral disarmament called for in the initiatives.

### The Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement, an agreement to promote transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, represents a first approach in the Post-Cold War period to a controversial issue, arms transfers. Unlike COCOM, a regime designed to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the Wassenaar regime was set up in cooperation with Russia, updated to fit today's technology, and designed to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies to potential proliferators. In an effort to be inclusive, this Arrangement will not be directed against any state or group of states and will not impede *bona fide* civil transactions. Nor will it interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, the Arrangement illustrates that in a different time and context, with the involvement of different interests, and with a reduced threat, the negotiators of an agreement have applied different evaluative criteria to its successor. Economic and domestic interests are more important in the Wassenaar Arrangement than they were in COCOM: Italy, for example, has insisted that revolvers and non-automatic pistols and rifles be exempt from its export controls; and Russia and France have formally expressed reservations about the regime's munitions list, stating that they view it as a "reference list" only.

The Arrangement exemplifies the "building block" approach to arms control: it is a

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<sup>30</sup> Later Yeltsin made a public statement to the effect that Russia was the only legitimate nuclear successor state to the FSU.

<sup>31</sup> Russian views on these unilateral commitments are given in more extensive detail by A. Amirov in "Controls on Substrategic Nuclear Weapons," in Russian Arms Control Compliance and Implementation, ed. Alexei G. Arbatov. The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995.