

4. Each side will have the right to place inspectors at each other's entry/exit points.
5. Each side will have the right to make up to 18 air or ground inspection trips in the area of reduction belonging to the other side.
6. There would be periodic exchange of data and information on the forces in the area after the treaty becomes effective.
7. The non-interference with National Technical Means provision found in SALT would also be followed in MBFR.
8. A Standing Consultative Commission, similar to that found in SALT, would oversee compliance with the treaty.

Of these, the first two are Notification Measures, the third is a Deployment-Constraint Measure, the fourth and fifth are Inspection Measures, the sixth is an Information Measure, the seventh is, obviously, a Non-interference Measure and the eighth is also an Information Measure.

Inspection Measures, then, provide for the cooperative placement of human and/or inanimate monitors within the territory of potentially hostile states. The purpose, generally, is to facilitate verification of specific constraints and, in so doing, contribute to improved levels of trust, confidence and predictability. They are almost always complements of particular Constraint Measures.

1. **Provision for Observers during Out-of-Garrison Activities.** This is a relatively broad collection of proposals that deals with the permanent or temporary placement of military observers to confirm the nature of several types of military manpower and equipment movements.
 - 1.1. **Manoeuvres in Sensitive Areas.** Several proposed Constraint Measures restrict the numbers and/or types of personnel and equipment permitted to exercise in sensitive areas such as border zones. The use of observers both within the zones and with the manoeuvre troops would facilitate the verification of such undertakings and, by the very acceptance of observers, increase

confidence in the benign intentions of potential adversary states. Conceptually, there are *five basic varieties of monitor arrangements possible within this type of Inspection Measure*. They are: (1) human observers temporarily placed with units in an exercise; (2) human observers temporarily placed in a sensitive zone prior to an exercise; (3) human observers permanently placed in a sensitive zone where exercises might be held; (4) electromechanical monitors permanently placed in sensitive zones where exercises might be held; and (5) electromechanical monitors temporarily inserted in a sensitive zone prior to an exercise. Combinations of these are also possible. The use of observers in this type of case should be distinguished from the non-intrusive presence of observers at manoeuvres. In the latter case, observers serve an educational function first and only indirectly any type of "early warning" function.

- 1.2. **Movements in Sensitive Areas.** Rather than supervising the conduct of manoeuvres in sensitive regions, this application calls for the provision of observers to monitor the nature of military movements from barracks to other sites within or near to a sensitive region. A good example of a sensitive region is the border area separating two hostile or potentially hostile states or alliances such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The obvious sensitive region is that adjacent to the inter-German border extending in either direction perhaps 100 kilometers. As in the previous case, there are five basic ways in which military movements through sensitive regions could be monitored, ranging from temporarily placed human observers to permanent electromechanical monitoring devices.

