group the shares are taken up by semi-professional speculators who apply for a great many more than they intend or are willing to hold. And woe to the promoter who saddles these gentlemen with the bulk of any company's shares. Unless he allows them to sell out at a profit to the bona fide investor, some other speculator or himself, his chances of appealing to them in some future promotion are uncommonly small. Hence the reason for the aforesaid conventional premium. When in addition to choosing the worst possible time Mr. Wright chose also a property in the worst possible country, British Columbia, for his experiment with the market, his effrontery was justly regarded as amazing. The market has the lowest possible opinion of British Columbia. On all sides the Le Roi No. 2 was scoffed at. That great bodies of ore had been patiently developed in the property was not known, or if asserted was not believed. The market looked upon Le Roi No. 2 as a very speculative extension of a mine, the Le Roi, which had still to accomplish much to justify its existence. This extraordinary ignorance of what may justly be called a great gold mining field has been largely fostered by the tone adopted towards the Rossland camp by the press and public sentiment in Canada, and throughout British Columbia. Such being the attitude of the public mind to Le Roi No. 2 the market proceeded to have its little joke with Mr. Whitaker Wright. Two things the market overlooked, first that there were a number of people who believed in Le Roi No. 2 as an investment, quite enough people to prevent the shares ever going to a very small price, and second that Mr. Wright knew more than the market did about the capacities of the mine and, apart from that, was apt to play the game of speculation with a dangerous amount of daring and abandon. It would naturally occur to the ordinary individual to consider when Le Roi No. 2 shares were forced to a premium which the press was unanimous in declaring could not be maintained, that with a minimum of risk he could well afford to sell short, as the Americans have it, on so unpopular a stock. The premium must shortly disappear and a good margin be made by the acute bear. The trouble seems to have been that this easy way of making money occurred to too many people at the same time, and incidentally, that Mr. Whitaker Wright took a diametrically opposite view of the situation. All the shares that anyone was prepared to sell he was prepared to buy, and not only so, but to bid higher and higher prices for the stock. It finally of course resulted in his possessing contracts for delivery far in excess of the actual capitalization of the company. He could then very well afford to take the shares of the actual alloters at a very high price, and so establish a complete corner by means of which the only limit to the price of the stock was the figure at which he could resell to those who had already given him contracts to deliver. He is reputed to have netted £750,000 by the transaction. The stock was marked up to over £12 for the £5 shares, around which price a general settlement of accounts took place. It is not necessary here to discuss the ethical bearings of such speculation. John Stuart Mill defends it as economically rational and proper; Messrs. Chadband and Stiggins denounce it when they happen to be on the wrong side of the market; and the ordinary grocer who adulterates his tea and sugar thanks Heaven that he is not endowed with as much brains as Mr. Whitaker Wright. It will be remembered that the fortune of the late lamented and pious Presbyterian, Mr. Jay Gould, was accentuated in much the same sort of operation, only he used his genius in the direction of railways, not of mines. Mr. Gould was always careful to have merit at the back of his railway combinations. Given two or three competing railways through a productive but undeveloped country Mr. Gould's *modus operandi* was first to wreck them, then combine them, and then foster their business in the territory they controlled. Strange paradox as it may appear, the rapid industrial development of many important sections of the United States was directly due to the railway wrecking genius of Mr. Jay Gould and his feebler imitators. In applying the parallel it is not necessary to consider the abstract morality of Mr. Wright's financial methods, merely the uncommon shrewdness, economy and success of his mining methods. The mines controlled by Mr. Wright in British Columbia are models of patient and intelligent development. They are worked in the most scientific way possible and have so far achieved excellent results in the matter of producing gold and copper. So long as this solid foundation of merit exists it is unnecessary to waste any sympathy upon the misguided bears. The market has always been consistently and persistently hostile to British Columbia;



Superintendent's Residence—the B. C. Copper Co., Anaconda, B.C

Mr. Wright and his friends have always been consistently and persistently friendly to British Columbia. The analysis of the Le Roi No. 2 boom is simply this, that the friends of British Columbia have abstracted a large amount of money from the pockets of the enemies of British Columbia and put it into their own. By this operation they have enormously strengthened the financial standing of the group of properties they control and have greatly bettered the prospects of the province, provided these properties are good ones. In this respect these properties may justly be considered beyond the problematical stage. Without Mr. Whitaker Wright Rossland would not be the sheet anchor of British Columbia mining as it is to-day. A most unfair comparison is sometimes instituted between him and Mr. Horatio Bottomley. But we humbly submit that it is one thing to "bluff on a pair of deuces" and quite another to bet high on "four aces and a king," although the two operations look precisely the same before the hands are "called." In conclusion it may be said that there is no reason whatever why Le Roi No. 2 should not pay fair dividends even on its enormous capitalization, although, perhaps at present, the outlook for No. 3 and No. 4 is not so favourable and the financail press of both New York and London are not far astray in the criticisms which have been passed on these promotions.