

between the known or knowable phenomena and the unknowable noumenon? In the illustrative examples given by writers on Philosophy, the impressions actually made upon our senses seem to be commonly spoken of in the phenomena, and it is thus implied that that which lies behind these impressions, and is the external cause of them, is the Thing in itself, or Noumenon, which is said to be unknowable. But as a matter of fact, we are able to go some considerable way behind these impressions on the senses, and to recognize that which we conceive as being the proximate cause of them. Modern Science has made considerable progress in the knowledge of the molecular constitution of bodies, and in showing the dependence of the properties of bodies on this molecular constitution. How, then, are we to regard this knowledge? Is it a knowledge of phenomena only, or of the external cause of phenomena? Mill, and others, have pointed out that if we could know much more than we do know about Matter, in consequence of our senses becoming more acute, or even of our obtaining additional senses, if such a thing were possible, this knowledge would still be relative in precisely the same way in which our present knowledge is relative, and therefore would be only further knowledge of phenomena, not of noumena. But this argument can hardly apply to the case we are now considering, seeing that the knowledge we speak of has been gained in quite a different way, not by any quickening of the senses, but by the exercise of the reasoning powers. It is true we reason on the data supplied by the senses, but the conclusions reached are not represented as sensations, or even as possibilities of sensation. Perhaps we do not form a very clear idea of what we mean by molecular constitution and molecular motion, but we certainly do not regard them as anything that can be a direct object of sensation. We cannot see or feel molecular vibrations as such, but we believe them to be the cause of sensations in ourselves, which we do not recognize as motion at all, but as light, or colour and heat. We do not conceive it as being in us or in our sensations as motion, but only in the body itself.

If, however, we imagine that thus, or in any other way,