

*Business of Supply*

subject to terrorist activities. So let us discuss today the possibility of a moratorium, the possibility of imposing some interim control. This can only come about if there is some form of agreement involving the half dozen countries which presently export nuclear technology.

Why should we not do what they do in the United States? Why should the government not come to this chamber, or a committee of this House, and ask for approval of any deal involving the export of a CANDU reactor? This sort of thing is done in the United States. These sorts of deals must now come before Congress. This House has an interest in seeing this sort of thing done in this country. Let us ask the government to come to the House, or to a committee, and let it obtain approval for a deal. It is not unfair to suggest that the government, to a certain extent, is involved in a conflict of interest. It wants to act safely, but I suspect it also wants to sell. It wants to see the CANDU reactor, the triumph of Canadian technology, used. It wants to do business. It would be best if some body, a committee of this House for example, if not the whole House, were to pass judgment on the adequacy of safeguards associated with any deal. I suggest this earnestly.

Let me repeat some of the suggestions which have been made in this area. No nuclear material, equipment, or technology should be supplied to any country, whether or not it is party to the non-proliferation treaty, unless that country agrees to place all its nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. This condition should apply both to nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. It has also been suggested that no nuclear material, equipment, or technology should be supplied to any non-nuclear country that has or is acquiring a nuclear reprocessing plant. I suggested this afternoon that reprocessing or recycling plants should not be exported. It has also been suggested that all spent fuel should be returned to the supplier country for reprocessing, or storage if reprocessing is not needed.

**The Chairman:** Order, please. I regret to interrupt the Leader of the Opposition, but his time has expired. He may continue if he has the unanimous consent of the committee.

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Stanfield:** Mr. Chairman, I shall take only a couple of sentences to finish.

**The Chairman:** Does the committee agree that the Leader of the Opposition may finish his remarks?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

**Mr. Stanfield:** The suggestions of a technical nature are important but, fundamentally, the question is can we, by adopting a moratorium, devise some means for bringing about technical safeguards? Can we get the half dozen exporting countries to adopt them? Also there is this fundamental question to consider: should not this House, or a committee of this House, pass on or judge every deal which the government makes for the export of nuclear material, nuclear technology, or a nuclear reactor? I put these suggestions before the committee, Mr. Chairman,

[Mr. Stanfield.]

because of the immense, unbelievable horror which could confront the world if nuclear proliferation becomes the reality which it is well on the way to becoming.

[Translation]

**Mr. Lapointe:** Mr. Chairman, the issues discussed by the previous speakers, the representative of the New Democratic Party (Mr. Broadbent) and the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield), are extremely important at the present time and more especially for the assessment of our foreign policy which we must now develop. The aid programs to the third world have been widely discussed in the Committee on External Affairs and almost all members of the committee have come out of those sittings with numerous questions which had remained unanswered. In the field of nuclear proliferation, it is agreed that all hon. members share the concern voiced by the Leader of the Official Opposition.

However there is another matter in our foreign policy which is also extremely significant and that is the contractual relations which the government is now establishing with the European Economic Community. I think that with the two previous issues, this third component of our foreign policy is highly momentous. The acknowledged or unacknowledged referral to Washington remains the main feature of our foreign policy. However, it can be stated that the wish of Canada to have freer play from our American neighbour is also a guideline of that policy and it is in that context that we are trying to establish relations with the European Economic Community.

Going back to 1970, when the white paper was published, one realizes when reading booklets on that white paper that the key word in each of those studies is diversification. At that time, a very special dimension was given to the French-speaking world in our foreign relations while restating our links with the Commonwealth, our relationship with NATO and, of course, our particular ties with the United States of America. On the other hand, that White Paper uncovered a new concept or a concept expressed as clearly for the first time, that of economic nationalism in our external relationships. And that economic nationalism necessarily requires a diversification of our sales of raw materials and finished products. And during the years that followed the release of the White Paper it is in the direction of China, the U.S.S.R., Japan and Latin America that we made constant and new efforts, seeking markets for our raw materials.

Finally, in order to complete that 1970 White Paper, in October 1972, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs considered the over-all problem of our relationships with the United States. The three possible courses of action submitted to him at that time for decision included the possibility of maintaining the status quo with everything which that implies from the standpoint of American investments and influence over this country. There was another alternative: that of further integration with the United States under the continentalism we are experiencing. And finally, there was a third alternative, the one which was accepted, that is asserting our identity while excluding any anti-Americanism.