

general of the Chinese communist party, Teng Hsiao-ping; and the opposition also probably includes a majority of senior officials in communist party ranks throughout the country.

Some have clearly been fighting back in order to save their jobs—not their skins, because purges in China are rarely bloody—and to protect their friends. But I think there is a real difference between Mao and the opposition over specific matters of policy. We should not have any illusions that the opponents of Mao are, in our terms, necessarily liberals. They certainly are not; they are very dedicated veteran revolutionaries and communists. But they seem to have very different ideas from Mao as to how the nation should be run. These men, more than Mao, are the men who have been running the nation to a large extent for the last 18 years. As a background of their concern there is a realization that China faces very real problems: the problem of how to regain the economic and the political momentum of the years immediately following the victory in 1949; the problem of how to extend the considerable social and economic achievements of those early years. The momentum has been lost; they are trying to regain it. Involved in all this is the tremendous problem of how to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains, with a population that is rising by at least 2 per cent a year and, at the same time, break through to become a modern industrial power. These are tremendous problems that any Chinese government would face today, and there is a real and significant difference of opinion. The opponents of Mao reject his romantic, visionary, and rather simplistic, communism; they reject a return to the policies that Mao followed in the revolutionary bases in the 1930s and 1940s. They say in effect, although they would express themselves in much different language. "This is 1967; China is a nuclear power; China has steel mills; China is united; China is now on the world stage; we cannot follow these unsophisticated policies that you, Mao Tse-tung, have been advocating". Naturally their language would not be anything like that, but I am trying to translate how we might consider their arguments. They are very much aware of the dangers of abandoning the relatively pragmatic economic and social policies that the Chinese government and party have been following since about 1960 in order to recover from the very bad economic crisis they had in 1959 and 1960.

Mao, as I said, seems to have been in a minority amongst the senior leaders of his own party. His tactics have been not mad at all, but extremely shrewd and brilliant. Although in a minority, he has cleared a certain amount of success. He has done this several ways. He has relied on Lin Piao, the defence minister, who is now his heir apparent, and on whatever segments of the army that Lin Piao can speak for, and he has clearly picked Lin Piao—it is not so clear these days, but it seemed clear a few months ago—as his successor, as the most dedicated man and the man most guaranteed to carry on Mao's ideas after Mao's death. Mao is 73; Lin Piao, although we know he is a sick man, is only about 60.

At some point a deal was made between Mao and the prime minister, Chou En-lai. We do not know the details but we assume some sort of deal was made whereby Chou En-lai, who is a very important man in the hierarchy, said, "All right, go ahead and purge the party, but leave my government apparatus alone". This deal has not been an easy one; it has shown signs of breaking down at times, but so far Chou En-lai has gone along with Mao Tse-tung. It is a sign of Mao's isolation within the ranks of his senior party members that he has had to rely increasingly on personal confidants, such as his old political secretary, a man