

permanent members on the numbers and types of United Nations forces. At that time, these forces were to be provided by the permanent members themselves, and it was not surprising, given their very different experiences during the war, that they should find it impossible to agree on the contributions each should make to the United Nations.

The atmosphere of the cold war stifled any further work by the Military Staff Committee, and its functions were afterwards executed by the Secretary-General. Now, however, the theory and practice of UN forces has changed. Their purpose has not been the enforcement of UN decisions against recalcitrant states but the supervision of agreed arrangements. The non-permanent members have become the major troop contributors. A good deal of experience is available for analysis. There may be some basis for believing, therefore, that the Military Staff Committee, enlarged by the addition of several non-permanent members as the U.S.S.R. has proposed, could work out some standard rules and regulations for peace keeping.

Another possible answer to the question I have posed of who is to do the planning is that the governments chiefly concerned should do it themselves, independently of the United Nations. This is a possibility which Canada explored in 1964, when we convened a conference of military experts from 23 governments to consider the technical aspects of United Nations peace keeping. Since that time a somewhat similar conference has been held in Oslo. For our part, we are ready to carry further this process of informal consultation outside the strict framework of the UN whenever circumstances appear to warrant it. We are ready, as well, to produce guide-books and training manuals based on our own experience, and after consultation with other governments concerned, to make them available for the use of the United Nations or of any of its members.

In considering the alternative ways of military planning that I have just described, Canada's principal concern will be the same now as in 1945: if we are to participate in United Nations police actions, then we want to take part as well in the planning and decisions which will lead to those actions. An enlarged Military Staff Committee, on which we would expect to be represented, might be one convenient method of achieving these objectives. In any event, we are prepared to co-operate in whatever arrangements may be made, inside or outside the UN, to improve the UN's capacity to fit its peace-keeping services to the diversity of present world conditions.

I want to take up now the second question I have asked -- how are member states to share the responsibility of peace keeping? This question raises what is, in my view, the central problem of peace keeping -- the procedures of political authorization and control. The primary purpose of the UN is to control conflict -- by consent if possible, by enforcement action if necessary. The use of force or coercion is subject in principle to the agreement of the permanent members of the Council to its use. I say in principle because, while it is clearly the sense of the Charter that coercive action cannot be taken by the UN without unanimous great-power consent, it was also the expectation of the majority of governments at San Francisco that this consent would be forthcoming in cases of acts of aggression or flagrant breaches of the peace. When by 1950 this expectation had proved to be illusory,