

Western, UN member states.⁵⁵ By funding UNMOVIC through the Iraq Oil-for-Food programme escrow account (0.8 per cent), the independence of the body, as well as the ready availability of funding, was assured. Had UNMOVIC been set up under the UN Secretariat or by the UN General Assembly, it would have had its budget scrutinized by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and undoubtedly seen it whittled down by those states that objected politically to its existence. UNSCOM's reliance on seconded staff provided and paid by UN member states (in addition to seconded personnel from various UN agencies) had called into question its independence, as well as being unsatisfactory from a managerial perspective. Independent funding enabled UNMOVIC to hire the necessary staff quickly, an essential requirement when inspections have been urgently mandated by the Security Council.

While the vast majority of its personnel undoubtedly behaved professionally and in the best interests of the international community, UNSCOM was to a certain extent subject to undue influence by some UN member states. This occurred in two ways. First, the nature and pace of inspections may have been shaped without the agreement of UNSCOM's executive chairman. Former US National Security Advisor Richard Clarke claims that he 'set up' the confrontational nuclear inspections under UNSCOM, with British connivance; it is not clear whether these were approved by the executive chairman in advance.⁵⁶ A second misuse of UNSCOM was the reported planting of listening devices by the US on its monitoring equipment and the use of inspections for national intelligence-gathering purposes as a result of inspectors reporting back to capitals.

Compared to UNSCOM, UNMOVIC was more successful in avoiding being taken advantage of by any UN member state. In addition it managed not to offend Iraqi sensibilities unnecessarily and was able to parlay strong Security Council support into achieving Iraqi cooperation, if not proactive engagement and full compliance.

Intelligence information and verification

There are continuing lessons to be learned from both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC with regard to the relationship between intelligence information and multilateral verification. Intelligence information can, in theory, be of great assistance to multilateral verifiers. It may, for instance, be derived from highly sophisticated NTM beyond the reach and budget of international bodies.

But, as in the Iraqi case, national intelligence data can also consist of analysis of information from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources or electronic eavesdropping. As the various inquiries by legislatures in Australia, the UK and the US have revealed, such intelligence information may be based on unreliable, self-interested and/or malicious sources. National intelligence agencies, adopting worse-case scenarios or under political pressure, can dangerously inflate their assessments. By the time such analysis and 'information' is provided to multilateral verifiers it may have lost its qualifiers, its context and often, in an effort to protect the source and collection method, its provenance. International verification bodies thus need to be extremely wary of taking intelligence information provided by states at face value, even when it is supplied in good faith. Rolf Ekéus says that in any event the 'much-hyped intelligence provided [to] UNSCOM by member states was

⁵⁵ Notably Australia, France, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US.

⁵⁶ Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*, Free Press, New York, 1004, pp. 67-69.