

kinds of threats and adopt a new approach to, and concept of, security. The new approach, termed cooperative security, would take into account military concerns, but focus equally on non-traditional elements of security, including economic well-being, democratic development and environmental quality. It would be achieved through dialogue, consultation and cooperation at the regional level covering the whole range of inter-state relations.

In looking at the range of institutions and instruments that could be used to promote cooperative security, Canada viewed the CSCE as an ideal candidate. Its broad mandate and attention to three baskets were ready-made for the approach. Although Clark in July was to call for a cooperative security dialogue in the North Pacific, and in September would spell out cooperative security guidelines at the UN General Assembly, Canada saw the CSCE as affording the best opportunity to make the security policy review operational.

In Basket I, security would result from a series of related political agreements and understandings, military arrangements, confidence-building measures and verification mechanisms. "Hard" security issues such as conventional force reductions, military strategies and force structures would continue to be dealt with in and through NATO, as would firm military commitments. Even here, however, Canada favoured a gradual cross-over to a broader CSCE framework. The CSCE would have a role in mandating a further round of conventional force reduction talks, which should be among all 35 CSCE participating states, not just the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, Canada felt the CSCE should develop a fuller role in conflict prevention and mediation, as will be discussed below.

With respect to Basket II, security would be enhanced by the successful transition from command to market economies in Eastern and Central Europe. Although specific tasks in this area could be left to economic institutions such as the ECE, the OECD, the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the CSCE could encourage the process by establishing a political framework for economic cooperation and by developing common principles of economic activity. Canada advocated establishment of a permanent CSCE forum for economic dialogue.

Continuing attention to Basket III would be essential to security in Europe. The most likely threats would stem not from calculated territorial aggression but from ethnic rivalries, mistreatment of minorities, resurgent racism and uncontrolled migration. The protagonists were more likely to be sub- or cross-national groups than nation states. Canada viewed the ability of participating states to comment on internal issues and to hold CSCE states accountable for their actions in terms of their CSCE commitments as crucial to post-Cold War security management.

### **Institutionalization**

This was fundamental to Canada's European strategy. In order for the CSCE to become an effective and preferred forum for addressing security, economic and social questions, there had to be a regular or permanent venue where participating states could discuss pressing issues as they arose. In the past, proposals for CSCE institutionalization -- which had emanated primarily from the USSR and Eastern Europe -- had been anathema to Canada and other Western countries. They regarded the CSCE's lack of a permanent seat as one of its greatest assets, enabling the process to avoid the fixed and crowded agendas,