

forces of the three countries equally well. It will be able to switch traffic automatically through the system, using alternate routing when required. Single-channel access to the main trunk is planned, and the use of communication satellites will be considered.

Canada will contribute 5 per cent of the \$20 million (U.S.) required for the first phase of the tripartite development programme.

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THE OUTLOOK FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

(Continued from P. 2)

ment might be tackled in a subsequent negotiation. Accordingly, it may well be necessary to envisage a progressive re-application of the 1954 cease-fire terms as an agreed preliminary to direct discussions between the two sides and as something which would of itself help to create a favourable climate for such discussions....

STEPS TO A CEASE-FIRE

The first step should involve some degrees of physical disengagement of the parties. This might be accomplished by restoring the demilitarized character of the zone on either side of the 17th Parallel by the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from that zone, by enforcing a prohibition against any artillery action across the zone, and by barring any overflights of the zone except for purposes of impartial supervision. At the same time, it would be necessary to reactivate those provisions of the cease-fire agreement which prohibit either North or South Vietnam to be used for the carrying out of hostile acts against the other. In my view, this would in equity have to include the bombing and any other military action against North Vietnam, whether actually undertaken from South Vietnam or from some other point of origin.

Second, I think it would be necessary to freeze the course of military events in Vietnam at its present level. This might entail undertakings on both sides not to engage in any military activities which differed in either scale or pattern from the activities which are currently being engaged in. It might also entail the practical re-application, as from an agreed point in time, of those articles of the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement which prohibit reinforcement of troops or arms, munitions and other war material into North or South Vietnam from any source or quarter.

The third stage of such an approach would logically involve the cessation of all active hostilities between the parties, whether on the ground, at sea or in the air.

The fourth and final stage would complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement. At that stage, provision would have to be made for the liberation and repatriation of prisoners, for the withdrawal of all outside forces

whose presence in the area of conflict was not provided for at Geneva, and for the dismantling of military bases or their conversion to peaceful purposes....

POLITICAL ISSUES

...I am doubtful if it will be possible to solve the purely military aspects of this conflict without at the same time tackling the political questions which lie at the root of it. As I have already suggested, this applies to the approach I have outlined to the Committee as it would to any other approach to this issue.

The simple fact is that these aspects are interrelated and that progress on one front may well depend on progress being made on the other. I am inclined to think that the recent experience of the Secretary-General bears out this impression. On the face of it a stand-still cease-fire does not look as if it should involve any inordinate problems for either side if there was a willingness in principle to stop the fighting. On second thought, however, it will appear that such a cease-fire does pose problems for both sides to the point where one side cannot envisage such a move being made without prior discussion, if not negotiation, while the other cannot apparently see it being made at all in present circumstances. It is my considered view that, apart from any possible military problems, there are political problems posed by this proposal which are such as to have a bearing on the terms on which the conflict may eventually be resolved.

The underlying political issue as I see it are the ultimate political arrangements in South Vietnam and the willingness of others to allow those to be worked out by the South Vietnamese people without interference from any quarter. One aspect of this issue, of course, is the status of the Viet Cong. What is at stake here is not really their representation at any eventual conference table but the terms of their participation within the ultimate political structure of the country. These are the really crucial points which will have to be resolved and on which, I am afraid, the position of the parties are as far apart as ever.

It is clearly not for Canada, any more than for others, to prescribe to the South Vietnamese people how to order their affairs. I have made it clear that we regard a continuance of the present division of Vietnam into two communities as probably unavoidable for the time being if onlv to allow the scars which have been opened by the conflicts of the past quarter century to heal and for new dispositions to be agreed for the eventual reunification of Vietnam. It will be for the people in the two parts of Vietnam to decide how soon and under what conditions the first steps towards reunification can reasonably be taken. I am convinced that there is a basic desire for reunification in Vietnam as there is in other divided countries. At the same time, it seems to me on the basis of recent statements that there is also a realistic appreciation on both sides that reunification is not something which is likely to be accomplished overnight....

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