concession that Spain would welcome his own appointment while he continued to reside in Rome. He was given a copy of the letter to the Consul-General and the views expressed at the General Assembly were again summarized. The letter added that we could hardly consider appointing a Minister while the U.N. resolution still stood, and in any case would not wish to accept a Spanish Minister, unless it were possible to reciprocate at an early date, which current staff shortages made out of the question.

130. After a request from the Department of Trade and Commerce the Cabinet agreed on July 13, 1949, to the appointment of a Trade Commissioner in Spain, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Concurrence was given, but Mr. Pearson continued to express the same views as in the past in an interview with Maclean's Magazine that appeared on October 15, 1949. After pointing out that Canada had no diplomatic representation in Madrid and had not supported Spain's attempt to join the United Nations, he continued:

"Certainly relations between the two countries . . . cannot be on as friendly a basis as they should be while the memory of Franco's relations with the Nazis and the Fascists during the war remains so fresh, and while so many people in Canada feel that this government in Spain does not derive authority from the Spanish people and does not admit freedom of speech, religion, and assembly".

But the interest in a more friendly attitude towards Spain continued to find expression in Parliament and elsewhere, as was illustrated by speeches from Mr. W.J. Browne, M.P., of Newfoundland, and Dr. Gauthier, M.P., of Quebec, in November, 1949.(1) Because of this and the changing attitude of the United States, a lengthy Departmental paper on Spain was prepared in December which reflected the influence of NATO. It concluded that the Spanish question had "resolved itself largely into a problem for the North Atlantic countries". It did not regard Spain as of sufficient strategic value to warrant inclusion among the Western countries, and argued that the policy of maintaining the status quo, unspectacular as it was, and liable to the danger of lassitude, appeared to be "the only possible and reasonable course to take". Yet the paper declared at the same time that it was important that Spain should take its normal place in North Atlantic political and economic planning as soon as possible. It believed Spain, as a democratic and co-operative power, could be of great assistance in maintaining a community of interests with Latin America. It laid down four main principles of policy for Canada:

- (1) to keep in step with the United Kingdom, the United States, and France;
- (2) to take no initiative because of lesser Canadian interests in Spain;

⁽¹⁾ In an editorial at the time the Toronto Telegram urged consideration of Dr. Gauthier's arguments. In I survey of editorial opinion on Spain during January and February, 1950, by the Information Division, the conclusion was reached that the cleavage of opinion occurred "primarily along religious and cultural lines" and that "prejudice, wishful thinking and deeply-rooted antagonisms played an inordinate part in determining attitudes". It predicted "an outburst of virulent denunciation" no matter what stand was taken by the Canadian Government. No such outburst occurred, however, on the announcement of Mr. Maguire's appointment as Trade Commissioner in Spain.