

ing: "We are far advanced along this path (meaning exchange of views between Governments) and there is no occasion to anticipate any very long delay before we arrive at appreciable results."

The outcome of these discussions was the Anglo-French naval proposals, which were submitted to the United States, Italy and Japan on July 30, 1928, and made public a month later. In view of the widespread criticism of the proposals, Lord Cushendun and M. Paul-Boncour considered it advisable to defend them before the Third Committee. Lord Cushendun did not understand why criticism should have been directed against the French and British Governments: all sorts of ulterior motives had been attributed to both parties, but this simply showed that the critics had not considered that the endeavour to reach an agreement had arisen out of the work of the Preparatory Commission and as a result of suggestions made by various delegations before the Commission. M. Paul-Boncour was not sure that the reception accorded this new Agreement would encourage others to follow their example. Although they (the negotiators) did not expect to be crowned with laurels, they were justified in expecting something better than distrust.

Under existing circumstances it appears unlikely that at the next session of the Preparatory Commission, the Anglo-French Agreement will serve as a basis for further negotiation on the moot points of tonnage classification and conscription.

Very divergent views were expressed concerning the work done thus far by the Commission toward Reduction of Armaments.

Several states expressed disappointment that it had not been possible as yet to arrive at some sort of agreement, at least in respect of the general principles of disarmament. Very naturally the delegations which expressed keenest dissatisfaction were those representing nations disarmed by virtue of the Peace Treaties. They considered it was time that, under Article 8 of the Covenant, a start was made in the general reduction and limitation of armaments. The Hungarian delegation maintained that the conditions of complete disarmament imposed upon the vanquished nations were a transitional measure to facilitate this general disarmament. The British, French and Japanese representatives showed how their Governments had already voluntarily undertaken and carried out an important program of disarmament.

Some delegations, on the other hand, considered that disarmament could only follow upon, not precede, security. In this connection references were made to the new Conventions for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, and to the Treaties of Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance, as well as to the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. The Serb-Croat-Slovene, Polish and Roumanian delegates did not, however, appear over-sanguine about the degree of security afforded under existing conditions.

There was protracted discussion with respect to the date, if any, which the Third Committee should suggest to the Assembly for the convening of the next session of the Commission. The German delegation not only wished to fix a date for the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission, but urged that the Assembly should convene in 1929 the first session of the General Disarmament Conference. The French delegation favoured fixing a date for the Preparatory Commission, but not for the Conference. Lord Cushendun, on the contrary, expressed doubt as to the wisdom of fixing a definite date for either. He recalled the warning of the United States representative at the last session of the Commission that if a definite date were set, adjournment might have to take place immediately after arrival at Geneva owing to lack of agreement on some point. Hence, time, money and labour would have been expended uselessly. The Italian and Japanese delegations agreed with the British view.

M. Loudon (Netherlands), President of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, thought that before the Commission could meet again the great naval