

decision makers who consciously adjust (or at least attempt to adjust) their policy to external (i.e. NATO) developments would be more interested in using Confidence-Building Measures to achieve policy aims. This only suggests greater *interest*, however, and not necessarily cooperation. Such activist decision makers might be inclined to attempt to *use* CBMs to constrain NATO while allowing their own forces the greatest possible freedom of action. It should be apparent that the possibilities for successful Confidence-Building are not assured.

The basic point here is that realistic and useful evaluations of Eurocentric Confidence-Building prospects must depend upon our understanding of (1) what Soviet (and, for that matter, American, German, Polish, French, etc.) conventional military policy (including doctrine) actually entails; (2) why it has developed in the ways it has; (3) the degree to which it is influenced significantly by developments in other states' military policies; (4) the extent to which it is subject to relatively precise control and adjustment; and (5) what the true (and perceived) military balance is. One more example of how alternative interpretations of Soviet policy and the nature of the conventional military balance can alter evaluations of Confidence-Building prospects may serve to make this point more clearly. In this case, the illustration employs an "action-reaction" (rational) model of Soviet and NATO defence policy formulation, emphasizing efforts to counter each other's conventional doctrines.

The recent revision in American Army doctrine – the so-called AirLand Battle Doctrine as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (*Operations*) – provides an instructive example of how basic conventional doctrines can interact and produce (perhaps) unintended consequences for Confidence-Building. The AirLand doctrine of 1982 represents a fairly sharp departure from the 1976 doctrine of "active defence" (although, in practice, the revisions may not be so pronounced).<sup>89</sup> Rather than concentrating on forward defence, AirLand stresses a much

more aggressive extended and co-ordinated battlefield approach intended to take advantage of perceived Soviet weaknesses and American strengths. The essence of AirLand is manoeuvre and deep attack which, in combination with "battlefield air interdiction", are intended to permit American (and other NATO) forces to victimize the inflexible C3 of Soviet forces and their habit of rigid echeloning.<sup>90</sup> As most authors have recognized, this is a risky strategy because of: the crucial reliance it places on extremely accurate and timely intelligence information (for pinpointing Soviet forces); its central dependence on potentially unreliable and very costly deep attack "smart" munitions; and (most dangerous) the fact that it effectively requires the commitment of reserve forces for use in counter-attacks. In addition, it makes certain assumptions about the fragility and inflexibility of Soviet C3I and the deployment of Soviet forces that may not be accurate. The preceding discussion of Operational Manoeuvre Groups, for instance, suggests that the U.S. concentration on finding and attacking a TMO (theatre) or Front's "second echelon" may be a fatal error because there may not be one. As Hanne suggests, *the refinement of the Operational Manoeuvre Group approach and other developments in Soviet doctrine (and capabilities) may be a conscious and effective reaction to developments in American doctrine, actually leapfrogging the development of the AirLand Battle Concept which was formulated to counter an earlier version of Soviet doctrine.*

One can see in the development of the American AirLand Battle Concept and the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group a reasonably good illustration of how "action-reaction" interaction works. Neither development may be a particularly effective solution to the problems each side sees itself and its adversary facing but both appear to have been driven by concerns about the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and WTO policies as well as the impact of new conventional military technology. Both the Soviet and the American "solutions" appear to entail comparatively greater risk than the doctrines they replace. Curiously, both embrace fairly rigid forward deployments in combination with relatively

<sup>89</sup> Colonel William Hanne describes the evolution of AirLand in "AirLand Battle – Doctrine not Dogma," in *International Defence Review*, no. 8, 1983, pp. 1035-1040.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 1035-1036.

