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but keep in the same monotonous round? The speculations of M. Bergson throw little light on this phenomenon.

The many allusions to mathematics, biology, psychology in Bergson's works have undoubtedly strengthened his philosophy among careless and "fashionable" readers. They have imposed on philosophers who know less of mathematics and the experimental sciences than M. Bergson himself. But they have not impressed favourably those who know of these things at first hand. Mr. Bertrand Russell, who speaks with authority regarding mathematics, says, very drastically. regarding some performances of Bergson: "So long as the main object of philosophers is to show that nothing can be learned by patience and detailed thinking, but that we ought rather to worship the prejudices of the ignorant under the title of "reason," if we are Hegelians, or of "intuition," if we are Bergsonians, so long philosophers will take care to remain ignorant of what mathematicians have done to remove the errors by which Hegel profited."

While there is a great difference in the procedure of Hegel and Bergson, there is also something fundamentally common to the spirit of both. The former tried to produce a fusion between a pseudo-poetry and pseudo-logic; the latter despises logic. On the other hand, Hegel would undoubtedly have subscribed to a maxim of Bergson's that philosophy is not constrained to scientific precision, since he made such liberal use of it in his own Philosophy of Nature. Bergson, too, follows the Hegelian dictum that "Philosophy dwells in the region of self-produced ideas without reference to actuality." Consequently, he is able to give an a priori refutation of psychophysical parallelism and to maintain that consciousness is independent of cerebral structure. His method of refuting theories from which he dissents is well illustrated in his dismissal of the view that memory is physiologically conditioned. He denies this because it would involve the storing up of images and words in the brain cells; and, of course, he has not much difficulty in pointing to objections against this supposition. As if this, the crudest form of the psycho-physical theory of memory, were the only one in which it could be

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