

It leads to habit, which is only the repetition of an act. Whatever may be said of the origin of the "moral sense," it is admitted by all that one is bound to do what he believes to be right; to omit what in his convictions is wrong. The Professor clearly implies all this when he states that "we must first have earnest desire for the right and a habit of doing what we think to be right." But must not this earnest desire proceed from the will rightly and duly trained? And the will itself is moved to act under the command of our moral reason. By our moral reason I mean the intellect prescribing what is right to be done in any given set of circumstances. Hence, it is evident that knowledge goes before action. Of course if my will is, as Mr. Spencer says, merely "a group of physical states," and not an absolutely free determining faculty, the impulse it receives from the intellect may be accounted of little value. But I am so conscious of my absolute freedom that even when I am persuaded of the right, I can abstain from doing it, or act directly opposite. No antecedent desires, predispositions, or habits, can, of themselves, ultimately move me to act. "First train the will," says Mr. Murray. This will, unfolding and developing itself toward the right, must derive its acquired force from the proper influence exercised by parents and teachers. But does Mr. Murray forget that the most powerful medium through which both parents and teachers can exercise such influence will be by answering faithfully, as best they can, the "why" of ethical science? Bringing practice and knowledge into harmony is the best way to develop an abiding, rational course of conduct; for practice implies consent and advertence, and these, while they flow from the will, should be directed or superinduced by the intellect. In other words, right knowledge should predispose to right practice. That it does not always do so is a truth patent to the world. But I am not now discussing that point, but only guarding against an assertion of the Professor, viz., that "knowledge of what is right, what wrong, is only of secondary importance." Is, then, a blind will of no consequence? What is it that controls the sensitive and rational appetites of man, but the will; and what dominates the will, but an intellect informed by knowledge? Moral character is the sum total of habitual act or practice. But all conscious acts which alone are the responsible acts of a moral agent must emanate from deliberate choice. Is it of no consequence that the foundation of this choice or judgment be a basis of the most rational kind? The will is always impelled toward what rightly or wrongly is apprehended to be true or good. This apprehension is the act of the intellect. If the intellect is incorrectly informed, the conduct or practice flowing from the will, misguided by such an intellect, cannot be otherwise than morally wrong, though the same be believed to be right. Such was precisely the case of the Apostle Paul. He "verily thought with himself that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." (Acts xxvi. 9). He "did it ignorantly in unbelief." (I. Tim. i. 13). There was a harmony between his knowledge and his practice, but there was wanting what the philosophers term "*adaquatio rei et intellectus*." There was no equality between the objective truth or morality of his acts and his apprehension of the same. Hence, though in good faith, he styles himself a blasphemer. A misinformed or inadequately formed mind led to wrong acts. In his case, as in that of many others, reason did not carry a light before the will.

Professor Murray would have us *will* before we *think*. No

doubt much of what in the direction of right is only potential in the child may be evolved into act by the action of other intellects or wills, those, namely, of parents or teachers, without the child having any knowledge of the rational grounds on which such action proceeds. Parents and teachers may satisfy themselves of the reason "why" without attempting to put such knowledge into the undeveloped mind of the child. But the child, like the grown-up man, is always evolving from an inner life of thought, the texture and coloring of his acts, and in my opinion it will never be too soon to give him as rational an explanation of every act we wish him to perform as it is possible for him to apprehend at the time of doing it. An ethical conscience is not a *mere faculty* of the mind; it is a judgment elicited from right reason, and this implies knowledge, duly, adequately and correctly imparted. Even Mill himself declares it to be a rule of prudence "to make use of knowledge for guidance." Try to get the child "to do, to think," is, I am persuaded, the best method to follow in imparting ethical instruction. Combine as far as possible knowledge with practice. But will "mere information" secure "good thinking?" "Never," answers Professor Murray. By "good thinking," I presume he means an accurate, logical, prudent, and righteous way of weighing matters. Granted that "mere information" does not give a keen edge or religious turn to the mind; still, I ask, how can such thinking be secured without adequate knowledge as our data? "Cram," doubtless, is unnecessary to right modes of thought, but adequate knowledge is essential to valid and conclusive judgment, and this judgment can never be left out of account in ethical acts.

What reason does Professor Murray give for saying that in ethical instruction "knowledge of what is right, what wrong, is only of secondary importance?" Because the attitude of the child toward right and wrong is not "determined by careful reasoning." Whoever asserted that it was? "It seems to me," he says, "that the advocates of such teaching think that the actions of children are determined by careful reasoning. The child forms a correct notion of what is just; the present act, the child thinks, belongs to that group of acts which we call just; the child says, this act is just; then infers that it should be done; and finally he is supposed to do it. Hence they think the first requisite of right doing is correct notions of right and wrong." Putting aside this last sentence, I, for one, entertain no such silly notions as contained in the preceding ones, and yet I am far from being persuaded by any arguments as yet advanced by the Professor, that "knowledge of what is right, what wrong, is only of secondary importance." I tell the child to do this, or that; or omit some act I see him about to perform, and at the same time I give him a reason for my directions. I rightly and duly inform his intellect, thereby helping it to give an impulse to the will, which leads him on to practice; practice engenders habit, and habit *informs* character. But why does the child, in the opinion of the advocates of the opposite view, as Professor Murray says it does, "think that the present act belongs to that group of acts which we call just?" Is it because it is simply told to do it? No! that answer might be made by those who give their sanction to the Professor's way of thinking. Evidently because some instruction, something answering to the reason "why" had been given it. It may not have been able to understand the reason, but it felt all the same that it ought to perform the act. And what advantage Professor Murray's method has over this I fail to see. "The child says