

U.S.S.R. stepped-up the consolidation of her position in Eastern Europe, thereby bringing to fruition her inter-war policies for this area. But total disengagement was never accomplished, since Stalin failed to exercise a painful Western canker in Berlin. In the Middle East, the need for disengagement did not arise, and Stalin was prepared to withdraw from Northern Iran under pressure. In the Far East, disengagement was virtually and fortuitously guaranteed by the unexpected success of the Chinese revolution, and there remained only the Western canker of South Korea. It is as yet impossible to say whether the urge to deal with this sprang more from Moscow or more from Peking; but it is clear that this unsuccessful effort redounded to the greater advantage of the latter. For it was a central Chinese government which, for the first time, acquired firm military control over a Manchuria which was the focus of traditional Russian aspirations in the Far East; and to Peking went the prestige of having held modern occidental forces at bay. But all of this was not enough, and Moscow has had to try to think in still greater, indeed global terms. She has therefore worked since 1945 to secure the evacuation of Western forces from Europe and from all foreign bases.

The successors to Stalin have retained his goals, but they have found his methods too dangerous, too costly too difficult, and too limited. They have supported an end of warfare on the bloc periphery in Korea and Vietnam, and they have carefully refrained from public support for Chinese irredentism as regards Formosa. They have tried to reduce international tensions by breaking out of diplomatic and commercial isolation and by letting East and West see more, but still not all, of each other. They have tried to reduce the costs of maintaining their security system by withdrawals from Porkkala, Austria and Kwantung, by reducing the less critical elements of their armed forces, and by ceasing for a time the testing of nuclear weapons. In Eastern Europe they finally accepted the need to modify their policy, but too late to prevent the initial crumbling of their security system. And in the face of a global U.S. presence, they have sought to develop an active global policy and to achieve a global presence for the Soviet Union. This effort began, even before Stalin's death, when the Soviet Government awoke to the related facts that it had thus far ignored the less developed areas of the world, that Western empire in these regions was being rapidly supplemented, and, in some cases, replaced by what for Moscow was a colossal programme of Western assistance, and that the under-developed areas were attempting to duplicate the Western way of life as fast as possible. The Soviet riposte to the distant but menacing consequences of the Western policy toward these areas was desperate apostasy, for Moscow had to renounce Stalinism, if not Marxism, in supporting neutralism and nationalism, and a capital-poor country which was short of foreign currencies had to find a slender capital surplus in order, through credits, to develop long-term commercial links with Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. But, until very recently, the real gravamen of Soviet diplomacy has fallen, geographically speaking, in Europe. Moscow has only begun to enlarge the compass of its thought to embrace the Middle East; and it is important to note that, instead of relying solely on devious methods of penetrating this region, the U.S.S.R. has openly and explicitly asked for the right to contribute to high counsel on this area. At the same time, with her sub-surface and fisheries fleets, she has begun to penetrate the high seas, and, with research, to seek a foothold in Antarctica.

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A brief survey of Soviet foreign economic policy is of capital importance for our purpose. The primary aim of this policy in the 'twenties was to secure long-term credits and to restore commercial links with the outside world, indiscriminately, and as rapidly as possible. Failure to secure such loans compelled the U.S.S.R. to finance imports with