and for that purpose gave his wife power to collect money and to take therefrom enough to maintain his family and herself. And he directed his sons to pay her $150 a year after they received their lands, charging it on his lands, but they were not to pay it so long as she and the family were maintained out of the estate. The trustees were to pay $1,000 to each of the daughters as they attained twenty-one, and if there was not sufficient personal estate to pay them, the balance was to be a charge on the real estate: the real estate was to be divided between the sons when the eldest attained twenty-five, and then the trustees were to give him $2,000. The balance of the personal estate was to be divided between the sons, the eldest being charged with his $2,000. The testators' widow married again.

Held, that the children were only entitled to maintenance until they attained their majorities.

Held, that the widow was entitled to maintenance until the provision as to the $150 came into operation which would be when the sons respectively attained twenty-five. Although the maintenance was to be made from the personal estate, and no part of the rents were assigned for that purpose, as the devisees of the real estate were not entitled until they attained twenty-five, the intermediate rents not being disposed of descended to the heirs-at-law, *i.e.*, the children, and might be applied for their maintenance if the personal estate was sufficient.

When a testator has himself specified the time for the duration of maintenance, that will be observed; but the right to maintenance and support, when given in general terms, will cease with the marriage or forisfamiliation of a child. *Knapp* v. *Noyes*, Amb. 662; *Gardner* v. *Barber*, 18 Jur. 508; and *Wilkins* v. *Jodrell*, 13 Ch. D. 564, considered and commented on.

A widow ceases to be entitled to support and maintenance upon marrying again.

Quære as to her rights if she should again become a widow without means of support.

The personal estate turned out insufficient to pay the legacies of which the one of $2,000 was first payable out of those remaining unpaid.

Held, if the $2,000 legacy to the son absorbed all the personal estate the daughters would get none of it as their legacies were charged on the land, and that the $2,000 legacy and the legacy for maintenance must abate proportionally, and that there was no ground for marshalling. *Cook* v. *Noble*, 81.

2. *Construction — Intestacy — Blended fund—Distribution per capita.*]—A testator by his will directed his executors to pay his debts, funeral expenses and legacies thereinafter given out of his estate, and proceeded: "My executors are hereby ordered to sell all my real estate, after the payment of all my just debts and funeral expenses, and all my property and personal effects, money, or chattels are to be equally divided between my children and their heirs, that is, the heirs of my son G. and daughter E., now deceased; and my son J., Mary and Hannah, or their heirs. Should any of my said heirs not be of age at my death, my executors are to place their legacies in some of the banks of Ontario until the said heirs are of age."

Held, (1) That there was no intestacy either of the real or personal