

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

IN the preface to Prof. Baldwin's Elementary Psychology and Education (Vol. VI of this Education Series) I have dwelt upon the broad distinction that exists between external observation and internal observation, or between sense-perception and introspection. External observation sees things and records their movements, changes, and inorganic properties. Introspection perceives what goes on in the mind—namely, feelings, thoughts, and volitions. There is a wide difference between these two classes of objects. Outside things are all related to environments, and more or less dependent on them. The doctrine of relativity holds supremely among them; each is what it is only through the relation it bears to something else; on the contrary, the objects of introspection pertain to independent being, to that which controls and determines itself, to that which is not only an object but also at the same time a subject.

Hence all objects of introspection are double—they are both objects and subjects—they are phenomenal acts or manifestations, belonging to a self—and both are presented in consciousness or introspection. I perceive my feelings, but not isolately or abstractly—I