should not the inventor be allowed to make known his invention to the people of every Government, and from every Government receive his reward? A contrary course is not merely unjust to the inventor himself, but unwise so far as the interests of mankind are concerned. It is to the interest of every nation and every people to encourage genius in the pursuit of that which is useful. Those who minister to the wants or convenience of mankind, are entitled to be paid for their services.

It may be said, so far as we in Canada are concerned, that if we were to throw open our market to American inventors, whose inventions of labour-saving machinery are prodigious, our infant manufactures would be crushed, and our operatives left without employment. There may be something in this argument, but we do not think that it should be pushed so far as to exclude the American inventor from the benefit of our Patent laws. We do not exclude either the British or foreign author; we acknowledge his rights—give him protection for a term of years, provided he print and publish in this Province. Why not allow the British or foreign inventor to claim a like protection, provided he manufactures in this Province? This at all events would be an improvement on the existing law—a step in the right direction.

The law as it stands is very narrow in scope, and in consequence we think very defective. None but subjects of Her Majesty resident in the Province are entitled to obtain letters patent from our Government for inventions or discoveries. The result is, that British subjects resident abroad, and all foreigners, are excluded from its operation. It is not possible for any such, upon any terms whatever, to obtain letters patent. Surely this is too restrictive. It challenges the attention of foreigners, and is only challenged to be condemned. In the United States any man, no matter of what creed or country, with one exception, can for a trifle obtain letters patent for an invention. That exception, we are sorry to say, is the Canadian. If *he* desires a patent, he must pay five hundred dollars before his application can be entertained. He may thank the Provincial Legislature for this invidious distinction. The distinction is evidently made with a view if possible to compel reciprocity. We do not see why compulsion should be necessary. We think reason and justice both demand a modification of our Patent law. Indeed we also believe that self-interest joins in the demand.

OUR COLONIAL COURTS.

We are glad to find that the courts in England, since the blunders made by the Queen's Bench in the Anderson case, are disposed to hold that Colonial Legislatures and Colonial Courts are not, in the mother country, to be deemed mere nonentities.

Not long since we had occasion to refer to the extraordinary conduct of the English Court of Queen's Bench, which apparently ashamed of its rashness in ordering the *habeas corpus* in the Anderson case, afterwards in *ex parte Massenger* was oblivious to the fact, and refused to acknowledge that they ever considered such a jurisdiction as existing.

Now we have the satisfaction of learning that the able and much respected Vice-Chancellor Wood has scouted the idea of the English Courts having jurisdiction in questions affecting realty situate in the Colonies.

It would (says the V. C.) be a great surprise to the various colonies if they were to be told, that by an Act passed in England, to which they were not consenting parties, the courts of this country were authorized to determine the rights of property in the colonies as against the Colonial Legislature.

We yield to none, in respect for the English courts one and all, but we hate that feeling of cockneyism which leads some men to think that London is the world and the colonies—beyond the pale of civilization.

The occasion of these remarks is a case of *Holmes* v. *The Queen*, reported in other columns. The facts were as follows: In 1801 certain lands in Upper Canada were granted by the Crown to a Mrs. McQueen. In 1827 the Rideau Canal Act was passed. It authorized, on given terms, the assumption by the Crown of lands through which the canal passed. It passed through the lands of Mrs. McQueen. In 1832 Colonel By purchased from the heir at law of Mrs. McQueen all the lands granted by the Crown to her, and of which she had made no disposition. In 1843 the 7 Vic. cap. 11 was passed, which, by sec. 29, provided that all lands taken under the authority of the Rideau Canal Act from private owners for the uses of the canal, and not used for that purpose, should be restored to the parties from whom taken. In 1856 the statute 19 Vic. cap. 45, was passed, for the purpose of vesting the canal and other ordnance property in Her Majesty for the use of the Province. Petitioners representing the estate of Colonel By in this Province filed a petition of right, claiming the restoration of so much of the land formerly belonging to Mrs. McQueen, taken for the use of the canal, as had not been used for that purpose. To this petition the Attorney General demurred for want of jurisdiction, and the demurrer was sustained.

It is difficult to conceive upon what ground the petitioners hoped to sustain their claim before an English tribunal. It was indeed contended by counsel *arguendo*, that the Court having jurisdiction *in personam*, and the Queen,