

*Government Orders*

**Mr. Clark (Yellowhead):** Except when it counts on it.

**Mr. Brewin:** If the minister would be patient for a minute I will get to the rest of it.

Sanctions and the political isolation of Iraq will, in fact, if given time, produce the desired result. That is proposition number one.

Let me give you a second proposition.

**Mr. Clark (Yellowhead):** Tell me about political isolation and how you achieve it without military means.

**Mr. Brewin:** The minister asks how we can achieve isolation without military means. The minister's thinking is locked in the Second World War.

It is a tragedy that the minister and the leaders of the international community have not been prepared to take the additional time necessary to understand that the continued isolation of Saddam Hussein will, in the long run, produce the results that are necessary. Turning him into a martyr to international exterior power will itself be a problem, but beyond that the minister completely discounts the impact of war in that region. Innocent civilians—

**Mr. Clark (Yellowhead):** I do not.

**Mr. Brewin:** The minister says he does not. Let me suggest the minister fails to make an adequate balance between the cost of military action and the desired effect and object.

The desired effect and object is to bring Saddam Hussein to his senses over time, have him move out of Kuwait, and produce the kind of solution that the international community needs. All of the evidence is that sanctions, if given time, will work. Sanctions undercut prematurely, as the UN resolution proposes to do, will in fact move us to war much faster.

There is the bluff theory. I know the Secretary of State for External Affairs to be a peaceful person and I suspect, deep down in his heart, that he believes in the bluff theory, that if the Security Council passes this resolution, somehow between now and January 15 Saddam Hussein will see the light and back away. The problem with the bluff, Mr. Speaker, is that Saddam Hussein appears to be the sort of person who may well call the bluff of the international community.

The Secretary of State himself said that it is important that he get the message we are not bluffing. A resolution at the United Nations is not going to do that. No resolution will do that, because he is still going to be persuaded, I suspect, that all that is happening here is a bluff and he will be very tempted to call the bluff of the United States. That appears to be the way in which he works.

The risk is that, on the other side of it, the international community has given itself a deadline beyond which it must move. If he calls the bluff, the options of President Bush and others have been removed and those in the United States who urge war will have their way. What happens on January 16 if he has not moved? What happens if he has not moved on January 17?

The minister says this was not a deadline that could be interpreted as an ultimatum and that would be counter-productive. Precisely, Mr. Speaker. There should be no deadline. Sanctions should be given every chance to work and that should be the message to the international community.

**Some hon. members:** Hear, hear.

**Mr. Brewin:** Mr. Speaker, it is important, of course, that one consider carefully the effect of all of the permanent members of the Security Council, save perhaps China, appearing to be ready to vote for this resolution.

Let me contrast briefly the experience of the permanent members of the Security Council with that of Canada and suggest that our different perspective and our different experiences are also worth something and should be expressed clearly and independently at the United Nations.

The superpowers, perhaps by their nature and by their history, see military action differently than we do. All of them in their different ways have, from time to time in their history, shown a propensity to rely on military force to achieve political solutions: the United States in Vietnam, and in other places such as Panama and Grenada most recently; Britain in Argentina; France with its nuclear testing in the Pacific; and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

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We, in Canada, I submit, have quite a different experience. It is critically important that this experience be reflected at the United Nations. Our experience is