

Supply—National Defence

is not to protect this country or indeed even the populous centres of the United States, because indeed that is not possible. Its valid and primary purpose, the purpose on which it must stand and on which the expenditures must be justified, is to protect the bases from which the deterrent must operate and which would be the primary target of any aggressor.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that today our main protection is the deterrent, providing it can operate. So let us not fool ourselves. There is no protection, or very little protection, or almost incidental protection for Canadian soil or for Canadian citizens in this form of defence. The protection is in the deterrent in so far as it is able to keep the peace. If we ever had any doubts in our own minds as to the real purpose of the deterrent and the real validity of early warning interception as a protection for the deterrent, the testimony of General Power, who is the head of the strategic air command, I think, in February before the house sub-committee would remove those doubts. This is what he had to say:

The real backbone of SAC's deterrent posture is our alert system. As you know, under this system we maintain a certain percentage of the command on the alert 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. Airplanes are loaded with bombs; crews sleep close by. They are tested every day—we can get them rolling in about five minutes, that is, the first airplane starts rolling down the runway in five minutes.

This is the only force that a potential aggressor knows he will have to reckon with, no matter how cleverly he plans his surprise attack. If that force is big enough, and if it gets the 15 minutes' warning for which it is tailored, and if it can penetrate we think an aggressor will be strongly deterred.

If we get that warning, we can get these airplanes off the ground; therefore, even though an aggressor launches missiles against the United States—and nothing can stop them today—we will still get the retaliatory force off, that part of it that is on this alert; it will not be destroyed, and the aggressor will have to absorb it.

Well, Mr. Chairman, there is our protection, not interceptors and not missiles in the skies. There is our protection at the present time. That, I suggest, is the purpose, if it has any purpose, of continental air defence and early warning systems.

Now, the United Kingdom is perfectly realistic about this matter, as we would expect, realistic in a way perhaps that we should apply to Canadian defence policy. The United Kingdom, as I understand from reading defence discussions there and white papers, is not now even attempting to defend the island as such or even pretending that it is doing so. The white paper of 1958 had this to say in paragraph 33:

Fighter command has now the more limited task of protecting the bomber bases.

I ask the question, should Canada adopt the same principle? Perhaps the minister

[Mr. Pearson.]

will deal with this when he replies. I ask it as a question and not with any illusion that I know the answer myself. Certainly the United Kingdom now relies primarily on the strategic nuclear deterrent as a defence against all-out attack. Should we rely primarily on that deterrent and make our contribution to the deterrent? This is a view, Mr. Chairman, which is increasingly supported in the United States itself, notably in the evidence given before the house sub-committee on April 20 by a naval officer whom I quoted this morning, Admiral Hayward. He said this:

We are a member of a free alliance. There are 45 nations allied with us. We swim or sink with this alliance, and if we go to fortress America, and just forget it, we are going to die.

At page 316 he had this to say:

Since the air defence business of the United States has gotten under way, we have spent \$25 billion to defend the United States against the manned bomber.

He was asked "Since what date?", and he replied:

From about 1949, I would say, when SAGE, D.E.W. line, interceptors, and Bomarc were initiated.

He repeated what he had said earlier at this hearing:

I do not believe in fortress America. If we go to fortress America, the free alliance is going to die, and the proposal to put billions into these fixed systems for defending the United States I do not buy. I do not agree with it. This is my own personal opinion.

Mr. Minshall: You think it is another Maginot line?

Admiral Hayward: I certainly do.

Mr. Minshall: Would you feel, then, that we should put any more money into the Bomarc system?

Admiral Hayward: Personally I say no, I would not.

Then, after testimony was heard by the two committees, one in the Senate and the other in the House of Representatives of the United States, and the committees made their reports, the United States administration apparently decided not to go so far as Admiral Hayward suggested, but to divide its money and its resources between territorial defence and the maintenance of a deterrent of overwhelming retaliatory power ready and effective for swift and devastating counter-blow, and known by the potential aggressor to be ready and effective for that blow. A deterrent of this kind is now in existence and has been in existence for a good many years.

This, of course, produces an uneasy stalemate in the world situation which so far as calculated aggression is concerned may remain indefinitely. Therefore peace, the kind of peace—if you can call it that—which we