

The Budget—Mr. Blackmore

She particularly refers to the letter of transmittal to the white paper, which contains the statement I have just quoted from Acheson. Dean Acheson was wrong; Freda Utley was right. On page 31 of "The China Story" Utley justifies her statement in the following words, and I quote from "The China Story":

Perhaps Mr. Acheson did not study the white paper all the way through its unindexed 1,054 pages. For in the small-print annexes in the back, as will be shown, are a number of documents that glaringly contradict the words of the state department in the main text.

That is glaring falsehood No. 1. As for No. 2, Dean Acheson in a letter to Senator Connally on March 15, 1949, used these words:

Despite the present aid program authorized by the last congress, together with the very substantial other aid extended by the United States to China since V-J Day, aggregating over \$2 billion . . .

I quote this from "The China Story" by Utley, page 31. It is a glaring falsehood to say that China had received \$2 billion worth of aid. In "The China Story", chapter 2, entitled "Too Little, Too Late", Utley, after carefully studying the figures given on pages 1,043 and 1,044 of the 1949 white paper on China, says on pages 33 and 34:

Elimination of both the "service" charges and of the \$100 million or so of United States non-military "war surplus" stocks sold to China in 1946 reduces the total of post-war "military aid" to China to about \$360 million. This total is disputed by the Chinese national government. According to its calculations, China received \$110 million worth of "effective military aid" prior to the 1948 China aid act, which, together with the \$125 million allocated by that act, brought the total to \$225 million.

Next to the one I cited a moment ago, that comes close to being the second prize winner for the lie of the quarter century. See how colossal the lie is and what a false impression it has contrived to give concerning the strength of the communists, the weakness of Chiang Kai-shek, the position of Formosa and all these other matters which so vitally affect us in this dangerous hour.

Colonel L. B. Moody, a United States army ordnance corps officer who served with the Donald Nelson mission to China, after having made an intensive and detailed study of aid to China, said in a speech in Washington on April 11, 1950, and I quote from the speech as it is printed in Utley, page 35:

It is obvious that "military aid" means to the Chinese infantry weapons and ammunition above all else, and it is precisely these items which the United States action has consistently denied, delayed or limited.

No matter how much money might have been spent in China on anything else except bullets and the guns with which to shoot them, the aid would have been of no value;

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but even at that the aid which Acheson implied had been given was never given.

What I have already said in this talk will help anyone to appreciate, in some small degree at least, the significance of some words which I now quote from Dr. Hu Shih in his article "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy":

Such, in brief, is the story of the unfolding of Stalin's strategy of conquest in China. The heart of this strategy has been the creation, preservation and nurturing to full strength of the Chinese red army. It has taken nearly a quarter of a century for the red army to achieve sufficient power for the conquest of continental China. This red army was many times defeated, broken up and nearly annihilated by Chiang Kai-shek's armies; and Stalin and world communism might never have succeeded in China if the greatest war in human history had not intervened.

I may add to that, if in the course of that war it had not been possible to delude people so completely by falsehoods that had been spread about and never answered. I quote again from Dr. Hu Shih's article:

The pattern of conquest is therefore the same in China as in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It is the pattern of conquest by force and violence projected from the contiguous Russian base. What seems to differentiate China from the seemingly much easier conquests in central and eastern Europe has been the much greater complexity and difficulty of the conquest, which made it necessary for Stalin to resort to the most cunning forms of secret diplomacy in order to overcome the resistance that nationalist China had been able to summon for over two decades.

The cunning and secret diplomacy to which he resorted I am now discussing. My reference is to Dean Acheson and his monstrous performance in connection with this struggle against Chiang.

The Chinese communists, abundantly aided by Russia, played a part in driving Chiang to retire to Formosa. The Russian communists did far more, while the American communists under Dean Acheson really did the job of driving Chiang to withdraw to Formosa. Actually Americans Roosevelt and Truman, Dean Acheson, General George C. Marshall, backed by the United States communist organization—these are the men who drove Chiang to withdraw from China to Formosa.

The authorities which I shall cite today are given at pages 3025 and 3026 of this year's *Hansard*. They are "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy" by Dr. Hu Shih; "The Iron Curtain Over America", 1952, by Dr. John Beaty, at one time military intelligence officer in the United States all during world war II; "The China Story" published in 1951 by Freda Utley—the authenticity of these authorities I discussed on a former occasion in some detail—and committee hearings such as those of the McCarran committee of the United States Senate. Every one of these is of the very highest degree of validity.