

passed by a large majority without prior negotiation with the minority. A look at the voting record of the last session of the Assembly, for example, indicates that very few resolutions were adopted by a simple majority. On most colonial issues, there was a fairly consistent minority, varying between ten or 12 states and occasionally rising to 30 states, which opposed resolutions favoured by the majority, but in no case did these majorities fall below 80 votes except on the questions of Gibraltar and Oman (I refer only to recorded votes). Some observers have detected over the past ten years a trend toward unanimity in Assembly recommendations. While this may have been true in the early sixties, it now seems to be the case that differences between the developed or wealthy states and the rest over the kinds of actions which are appropriate for the United Nations to take in the development field or in dealing with certain colonial questions have reached a point close to deadlock. If I am right, the diplomatic function of the organization has suffered damage and there may be some cause for apprehension about the Assembly's future role in this respect.

I do not wish to exaggerate this anxiety. There have been many examples of determined and successful efforts to reach agreement on difficult issues and other examples where agreement may not have been reached but where honest and persistent attempts were made to do so. Let me mention some of these examples to illustrate the distinctions involved. A resolution was adopted in 1955, when I was the chairman of the Canadian delegation, which resulted in the admission of 16 new members, and which may be cited as an example of what I shall call "middle-power diplomacy". The 28 sponsors of the resolution were widely representative of the membership with the exception of the great powers. The latter split their vote -- China voting against, France and the United States abstaining and the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom voting in favour. However, all to some degree lobbied against the resolution and were only persuaded to act positively in the Security Council after the Assembly had shown that there was overwhelming support for the expansion of the membership. The reasons for this support were summarized in my statement at the time, which I quote because I think it is still relevant to the situation today:

"Our support of the draft resolution is based on a philosophy of United Nations as we see it, a United Nations which is as near universal as possible. We are aware of the fact that the expansion of the United Nations will introduce more voices, perhaps in some cases discordant voices, into a community where there is already much discord. We realize that by bringing in these members we may be swelling the opposition occasionally to measures which we shall undoubtedly be supporting. Unquestionably, it would be easier to sit back and prolong the present situation indefinitely out of fear of unknown consequences but in our view to do so would be a sterile attempt to preserve a restricted arrangement which is bound to be swept away sooner or later. We cannot ignore the nature of the world as it exists. If the United Nations is to survive and if it is to play the great role intended for it, then it must reflect the real world, not a partial world of our contriving. We see no reason to face an expanded and almost universal United Nations with timidity, to think only of the disadvantages and to forget the enormous opportunities."