The second important contribution made to the opening discussions at the emergency session of the General Assembly was made by the President of the United States of America. On August 13 he successfully attempted to translate some of the principles enunciated by the Secretary-General into positive proposals. Members of The House no doubt will recall having seen references to his six points in the press. He addressed himself in a positive fashion not only to the immediate but to the long term problems of the Middle East, and I would say here that in his address to the General Assembly President Eisenhower insisted at all times that any remedy for the anxious situation there and any solutions to the problems must be put forward and carried out by the United Nations. He took great care to say that he was not suggesting that the United States alone should carry out these measures, but rather would promote solutions of short term and long term problems under the aegis of the United Nations.

I would mention in this context that the President emphasized, as did the Secretary-General on August 8, the need to recognize the right of the peoples of the Arab nations to determine their own destinies, and he stated positively that no one could ever envisage solutions to their problems which would be permanent if they were in any manner imposed on the nations of the Middle East.

The third statement to which I should like to refer is that made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, who promptly endorsed President Eisenhower's remarks. That is the background which set the stage for the very constructive and profitable debate.

However, I have a fourth statement in mind to which I should like to refer. At an early stage of the meetings of the emergency session of the General Assembly we had the draft resolution and supporting statements of the Soviet Union. Far from attempting to broaden or build upon the constructive approach that had been made by the Secretary-General, the President of the United States and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Soviet resolution was essentially negative, dwelling solely on the question of withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from Lebanon and Jordan.

The Soviet resolution disregarded other Middle East issues, such as the economic issue and the political issue, that were directly involved in the deliberations of the Security Council and would have to be taken into consideration if anything constructive were to come out of the emergency session of the General Assembly. Those were disregarded. The role assigned to the United Nations by the draft resolution of the U.S.S.R. Would be that the Secretary-General would be given no opportunity to eliminate the underlying causes of tension in that area.