

existing foundations of European and Atlantic unity, and to aid and assist the various initiatives to this end within the framework of the Atlantic community, and against the background of the broader international arrangements in which the Atlantic countries are participating as good citizens of the world.

Its second task will be to take advantage of any and every opportunity new soviet tactics may present to break through the vicious circle of suspicion and fear in the "cold war", in an effort to test Soviet aims and to bring about genuine negotiation. If we cannot do this by a forward looking and flexible diplomacy, and without yielding to the temptation to relax our defence effort, (though we may have to alter its character), then NATO will hardly survive.

We cannot move, of course, from open hostility or sterile "co-existence" to constructive international co-operation without the searching testing period which would be provided by attempts to settle the several important issues which still unhappily divide the Communist and non-Communist world. These issues will not settle themselves; nor will they be settled either by brandishing our swords, or by throwing them away. We must be certain in NATO that if they are not settled, it will not be our fault.

The unification of Germany by the free choice of its people; effective and agreed disarmament, the right of captive European peoples to decide their own future; a European security system; a united effort by the major world powers to make the United Nations work as it was originally intended to work; all these are the testing grounds of the future on which the Soviet peace offensive must be judged.

It would be rash indeed to be dogmatic, either positively or negatively, about the real significance of the changes which have taken place in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin. We should avoid unreasonable optimism, for orthodox communist revolutionary tenets may still be dominant in Russia, and there is no peace in them. But also we would be unwise to reject out of hand the possibility that a new and pragmatic approach to internal affairs may be developing among the Soviet leaders, combined with a desire on the part of their peoples to return to a more normal relationship with other peoples. If this tendency were to extend, or could be made to extend, to the conduct of Soviet foreign relations and to the many problems which still divide us, we could at last begin to see more solid grounds for hope and confidence than we have now.

Therefore without illusions or without despair we must hold ourselves ready to strengthen and encourage