

considered as the "Focal Point" for the operation of the Protocol, with specified duties far beyond what is now the case for the Register. Perhaps this can be fruitfully investigated as a precedent.

v. Push DDA to hold an annual workshop for the expressed purpose of dealing with data discrepancies between importing and exporting states. If this is too sensitive, Canada and a group of other interested states should do so. The continuing level of discrepancies in data is eroding the confidence of those who are participating. They feel that the Register is becoming a stale exercise. Those not participating can point to this continuing flaw as a reason to continue their non-participation.

• *Enhance role of the Group of Governmental Experts.* It is now clear that many states do not participate at the expected level because they feel that the Register does not address the weapons that are used in the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts - small arms and light weapons. The assessment previously presented in this report concluded that on balance simply adding this category to the current seven categories would be counter-productive. However, the Group of Governmental Experts meeting in 2000 should consider the following actions:

i. Several attempts at generating regional registers have been made (e.g., OAS and West Africa). These should be not only encouraged in this review but also supported in more practical terms. The current GGE might also make some recommendations for action by other UN mechanisms, such as the Group of Interested States supporting the development of regional registers.

ii. Within the category of artillery, it should be possible to agree to add some weapons at the lighter end. The UN Group of Experts on Small Arms Report of 1997 established a typology of weapons that included mortars less than 100 mm. The artillery category starts at 100mm. The category could go down as low as 80mm and include weapon that has had a demonstrated impact in recent conflicts. Such a proposal needs to have such evidence if it is to be credible. The essence of the argument is that once combatants get mortars in quantity, indirect fire normally results in an increase in indiscriminate use and high casualty rates for civilians, promoting revenge and other outcomes which exacerbate the conflict. (e.g., Bosnia).

iii. Another particularly destabilizing weapon are man portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Given that there is credible evidence that such a weapon is inherently destabilizing, it could be singled out for special attention. The Group should single out the *transfer* of this weapon as the key variable, and somehow find a way to make transfer data more critical than either MH or PNP. The United States has begun an initiative to control these weapons.