

Formerly, the Programme was administered from Ottawa, where the Resources Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources handled every individual contract. Launched in 1962, it provides \$30,000 to assist prospectors in the Yukon and the same amount for prospectors in the Northwest Territories. Each participant may receive up to \$900 to cover approved expenses during the fiscal year. Of this amount, a maximum of \$350 may be used to purchase food and other supplies; the rest is for travelling expenses.

To qualify for aid, an applicant must undertake to carry on prospecting for at least 60 days. He then must keep a record of his work, to be turned in after its completion.

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#### PEACE KEEPING AND DISARMAMENT

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will shortly prove to have been significantly improved. I am hopeful that on that basis, and provided the need for at least some "on-site" inspection can once again be accepted in principle by all concerned, it may be possible to arrive at a comprehensive test-ban agreement which would command general support.

The more comprehensive application of safeguards to transactions in nuclear materials and equipment and the extension of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests would each represent an important advance along the path of containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Even taken together, however, they would be unlikely to prove adequate to the task of effectively dissuading additional states from manufacturing or otherwise endeavouring to acquire control of nuclear weapons.

It is true that, with the passage of time, it has become clear that the nuclear powers themselves have no intention of allowing their nuclear weapons to contribute to the creation of further independent nuclear capabilities. From their point of view, such a development would, at best, serve only to complicate the strategic picture. At worst, it could upset the nuclear balance.

#### INDICATIONS OF RESTRAINT

Of course, those powers have as yet done nothing to reduce their own vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Steps have, however, lately been taken by two of them to reduce the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and by a third to decrease its planned rate of increase in the output of such material. Those are welcome indications of restraint.

In the foreseeable circumstances of the next ten years, there may be as many as a score of states which could, if they were to make the necessary political decision to do it, acquire an independent military nuclear capability by manufacturing their own nuclear weapons. It seems axiomatic to me that, if these nations are to be expected to continue their voluntary abstention, if they are expected to go even further and make a formal international commitment to refrain from producing them in future, then the

military nuclear powers must accept responsibilities of their own. They must not only demonstrate increasing restraint in the nuclear field. They must also make renewed efforts to achieve early progress in the direction of general disarmament, including the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of all national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Canada is one of the countries that have the resources and the technical and industrial capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. I should like to believe that our abstention from the pursuit of a military nuclear programme may have served to encourage other non-nuclear states in following a similar policy. In the event, no middle or smaller powers have embarked on a programme of that nature and the expensive investment it would involve in nuclear weapons carriers of one sort or another. The world cannot, on the other hand, be certain how long that state of affairs will continue.

#### PROPOSALS FOR NON-ACQUISITION

Under the circumstances, it is encouraging to observe that some non-nuclear states have come forward with proposals for agreement on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, either generally or on a regional basis. Proposals on these lines have been developed in Africa and Latin America, two vast continents where there has far been no domestic production, or national possession, of nuclear weapons but where nuclear science may be expected to contribute significantly to economic development and social progress.

These proposals are to be welcomed as offering a fresh prospect of limiting the further spread of independent military nuclear capability. The idea of non-acquisition is not, however, free of difficulty. In particular, I think there has been a growing awareness that it may not be practicable to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through the agency of non-acquisition agreement in those areas of the world where non-nuclear states are apprehensive of the aims of a neighbouring nuclear - or potential nuclear - power.

#### GUARANTEEING NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Accordingly, it may be necessary first - or simultaneously - to guarantee the security of such non-nuclear states, at least against nuclear attack by the nuclear state concerned, if they are to be expected to forego the option of becoming nuclear powers on their own at some future date. Collective security arrangements have in large measure already provided a guarantee of this nature for the allies of the great nuclear powers. The non-aligned and neutral nations do not enjoy similar guarantees, and it is within their ranks that the spread of nuclear weapons is more likely to take place within the next decade.

For that reason alone, it seems to me probable that there will be an increasing tendency to correlate a guarantee of that nature with proposals which take as their point of departure the terms of the Irish resolution. That resolution, adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United

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