

[HILL] Was this the period in which General Rogers was beginning to advocate a 4% increase in defence spending, or did that come later?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think the 4% figure was launched while I was there.

[HILL] What kind of response did that meet with?

[TAYLOR] Well, of course 4% is generally beyond the capacities of all but a handful of Western governments. I do not think they have the financial resources and I do not think they have the political strength it would take to screw down other programmes for the sake of raising increased sums of that kind.

[HILL] You mentioned the no-first-use issue. Of course, another question that was under very active discussion in the period you were there was the whole idea of a nuclear freeze. This was the period of the big peace demonstrations in North America and in Europe. Did that movement have an impact on your own work?

[TAYLOR] Well, yes, although not so much the freeze. The freeze was really a sort of rallying cry in the United States. And I suppose it had its impact in Canada also, where to some degree the debate about cruise missiles and so on was linked with the notion of a nuclear freeze, I do not think Europeans were debating a nuclear freeze so much as those who disliked the notion of course were arguing against the deployment of the INF missiles. That was the focus of the counterpart debate in Europe; and that debate, as I have already said, was of course very much the essential political background to a lot of the discussions that went on in the NATO Alliance.

[HILL] Was this the period also in which Mr. Trudeau launched his Peace Initiative? I was just wondering how much impact that had on NATO headquarters as well as on the allies?

[TAYLOR] Yes, Mr. Trudeau undertook his Peace Initiative - I am trying to think - when I was first in NATO. In any event, in a sense it did not have anything to do with NATO. That was Mr. Trudeau's deliberate choice. He wanted to make it an individual thing; it was not something he wanted to push through the machine of NATO consultation. I guess his judgement was that what he wanted to say, the message that he wanted to convey, was best conveyed by pursuing quite a different route, in which one man made a kind of pilgrimage of his own; and that he was a voice crying in the wilderness, as he conceived it, because it did seem, at the time he made the trips connected with the Initiative, that there was no negotiation going on, and no possibility of a negotiation.

Well, of course we have come an enormous distance. I suppose you cannot blame people for pooh-poohing the history of all the abortive attempts to negotiate nuclear disarmament, because people can always say: "Well, yes, you say that the superpowers have tried and so on, but what's it ever come to?" That's a good question. Because after all, the best the superpowers have ever got, with all the urging from all the rest of us, are SALT I and SALT II, which were not reduction agreements, which were encapsulations of the existing plans of the two sides, in effect, which at best capped the race but did not actually reduce nuclear weapons. And SALT II, of course, ended up, as we know, being an agreement which the present United States Administration characterized as fundamentally flawed at the outset; and then -while it continued largely to observe the limits in practice - pointed out it was defective and had never been brought into force; and then finally with the passage of time, even had it been ratified, would have expired. Yet that is one major piece of