

international trial inspections. She suggested that there are lessons to be learned from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It is not a perfectly verifiable treaty, but the verification provisions are augmented by political procedures that enhance the signatories' confidence in mutual compliance. Thus, for the CWC we must search for political solutions where there are no technical solutions.

Nikita Smidovich also emphasized verification as the most important hurdle in the way of a CWC. It is key, he said, that negotiators at the CD pursue the most stringent measures for verifying the treaty. However, during the negotiations, compromises are hammered out and these measures become watered down. "Then we hear the comments: these measures are not stringent enough to verify certain kinds of activities."

The USSR is concerned about the rate of the negotiations. In September, guidelines were agreed for conducting trial inspections. Since then only a few countries have carried out such inspections. If they are truly concerned about moving rapidly towards a convention, then all countries should have worked out how to implement these types of practical measures.

Some countries argue that there must be exceptions to challenge inspections, that some facilities should be excluded. These same countries, Smidovich charged, will turn around and say that the CWC will never be verifiable because it's too easy to hide production activities. The only way to overcome this kind of objection, he said, is to allow every site to be inspected.

The next issue addressed by Smidovich was that of "extra-territorial jurisdiction." The precursors for chemical weapons and the equipment necessary for production are spread throughout the facilities of the multinational chemical companies. The problem is: Which nation has jurisdiction over these companies? The USSR believes that there is a mechanism in place to control the supply of precursors and equipment, extra-territorially.