section 259 only has reference to the two next preceding sections (257 and 258) and the other only to pounds and pound-keepers.

By comparing section 259 with section 256 of the old Municipal Act (22 Vic. cap. 54), it appears that the former is almost a transcript of the latter, with this material difference, that in the latter the words "the two last preceding sections" are left out.

And by comparing sections 256, 259 and 355 (23) of the present Act, I find what to my judgment as a layman appears an anomaly.

Sec. 256.—All prosecutions for penalties incurred by persons vending liquors without license, shall be recoverable with costs before *any two* or more justices of the peace having jurisdiction in the *municipality* in which the offence is committed.

Sec. 259.—All informations, complaints or other necessary proceedings may be brought and heard before *any one* or more justices of the peace of the *county* where the offence or offences were committed or done.

Sec. 355 (23).—Every fine and penalty imposed by *this Act* may be recovered and enforced, with costs, by summary conviction, under the Summary Conviction Act, before *any* justice of the peace for the *county or of the municipality* in which the offence was committed.

Thus, while by section 256 at least *two* justices of the peace are required to convict a person for selling liquor without license, sections 259 and 355 (23) appear to give authority to a *single* justice of the peace to convict *any* offender against *any* of the provisions of the Municipal Act, hence including the offence of selling liquor without license.

There also appears a difference in the kind or sort of justices of the peace, that are permitted to convict under that Act.

Sec. 256 authorizes justices of the peace having jurisdiction in the municipality where the offence was committed.

Sec. 259.—Justices of the peace of the county where the offence was committed, and

Sec. 355 (23) Justices of the peace for the county or of the municipality in which the offence was committed.

Should your information be, that section 259 does not affect section 256, then I should wish to know the *time* within which proceedings must be begun from the date of the offence, in prosecuting an offender for selling liquors without license.

I remain, Gentlemen, respectfully yours,

OTTO KLOTZ.

REVIEWS.

GEORGIA REPORTS, vol. 35. December Term, 1866; and a Table of Cases, reported in the first 31 volumes of the Georgia Reports: By L. E. Bleckley, Esq., late Reporter of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Atlantic, Ga., 1868.

We have to acknowledge the above through the courtesy of Mr. Bleckley.

The cases seem to be carefully reported, and many of them decide points of interest, more especially to the American people—such, for example, as the case of *Clarke* v. *The State of Georgia*, which is an authority, founded on an act of the Legislature, that persons of color are competent witnesses in all cases, just as white persons are; a proposition which to us seems sufficiently reasonable, and beyond discussion, though the lesson has been a difficult and a bitter one for Southerners to learn.

The reporter gives, in an appendix, some decisions of Judge Erskine, of the same State. The first of these must have been felt as a relief to the exasperated feelings of honorable men in the South, whatever the ultimate result of it may have been. In *Ex parte William Law*, he held that an attorney or counsellor, duly admitted to practice in a court of the United States, and practising there prior to the late civil war, and who has received and accepted a full pardon from the President, &c., may resume his practice in the said court, without taking the oath prescribed by the act of Congress, which act required an oath, in certain cases, that the person had not borne arms against the United States, or submitted to the authority of the Confederate Government, &c.; such act being, in its application to such person, in the opinion of the judge, unconstitutional and void.

To constitute the crime of bigamy, there must be a valid marriage subsisting at the time of the second marriage. A marriage between slaves was, in legal contemplation, absolutely void; but if the parties, after their manumission, continued to cohabit together as husband and wife, it was a legal assent and ratification of the marriage; and if, while such marriage exists, one of the parties marries another, it is bigamy.