

verses, that must have crushed him, had he not been upheld by a faith and singleness of purpose as great, as steadfast, as Pestalozzi's. Ridicule, persecution from Church, State, and School, pecuniary losses, the estrangement of friends, had no sting for him; his unfaltering faith in ultimate success sustained him in all trials and tribulations.

Froebel, in speaking of the difference between himself and Pestalozzi, says: "All my means of culture I formed from an idea; therefore, I begin with a type of unity (the ball)." And further on: "I am in pure contest with Pestalozzi; he started from the misery and want of poverty, from external conditions; I, on the other hand, from the internal, from my own peculiar view of life, hence from an idea." These propositions contain the key note of his advance beyond Pestalozzi; although, in the second proposition, this is clouded by a strange misconception on his part. It is true that the external motive of Pestalozzi lay in the misery and wants of the poor peasantry of Switzerland; but it is equally true that he was led to his work by an internal motive, by an exalted idea of the worth of humanity, and of its unity with all being. All ideas indicate but the more or less general drift of experiences, and of aims which, themselves, spring primarily from experiences, whether they be received directly, or indirectly through instruction or through the channels of heredity. Thus, Froebel, like all men of his calibre, was in truth led in his work by an idea based on "his peculiar view of life;" but he, too, like Pestalozzi, was primarily moved by an external impetus which he indicates clearly enough when he points to the miseries and wants of the educational practices of his time.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that Froebel attended more to his internal motive, his idea, than was the case with Pestalozzi, who was predominantly conscious of his external purpose, the relief of misery; and to this extent, Froebel offers, indeed, a contrast to Pestalozzi. His view of life, however, scarcely deserves to be called peculiar, since, as will be seen directly, it is the view which philosophers and teachers of mankind have at all times urged more or less clearly and completely. But his intentness upon his idea was peculiar, and to this may be ascribed also the peculiar clearness and completeness with which he apprehended his view of life and gave expression to it in his educational work.

Froebel sums up his view of life and of the object of education in the following words: "In all things there lives and reigns an eternal law. This law is enounced with equal clearness and distinctness in nature—the external,—in the spirit—the internal,—and in life—which unites the two.—This all-controlling law is necessarily based on a living, all-pervading, energetic, self-conscious, and—hence—eternal unity. This unity is God.—The divinity that is in each thing, constitutes its essence. It is the destiny and life-work of man, as an intelligent, thinking being, growing into consciousness, to a pure and unsullied, free and spontaneous representation of the inner law, of the divine in him.—The recognition of that eternal law; the insight into its origin, its essence, into the living connection among its effects; the knowledge of life in its totality,—is science: and, referred by conscious, thinking, intelligent man to its representation and accomplishment in himself, it is the science of education.—Education must lead and guide man to a clear insight into his own nature, to peace with nature as a whole, and to unity with God: hence, it must elevate him to a knowledge of himself and of mankind, to a knowledge of God and of Nature, and to the pure and holy life to which such knowledge leads." And elsewhere: "Education must lead the child, must lead the man to unification with life in all directions; it must lead him to full unification with his kind, with his neighbor, with society; it must lead him to the greatest possible unification with

nature and her laws; it must lead him to an indissoluble unification with the principle of all being, the alpha and omega of all life—with God."

On this broad and secure platform, made for all time, and for "all men, good and true," whatever may be their subjective ideas of God, Froebel placed himself; those ideas he held fast in all his work. It will be noticed, on closer scrutiny, that they contain nothing new, nothing that had not been deemed "pure and holy" long before his time; and yet, uttered by him, they seem like a new revelation. What is it that gives his utterance of them this peculiar charm? It is the fact that he first translated them fully, clearly, consistently into life, and into the work of education. Thereby he made them the common property of mankind, and invested them with a new and strong interest to many who had heretofore looked upon them as having merely theoretical value, and as the privilege of the favored few. Similarly, James Watt, and Morse, who did the same with the world's knowledge of electro-magnetism, appear as greater benefactors of mankind than those on whose shoulders they stand, and who, while recognizing the principles involved, failed to make them readily available for purposes of practical life; and many who gave no heed to the powers of steam and electro-magnetism while they were in the hands of the theorists and bungling inventors, now greeted them with grateful admiration as the discoveries of Watt and Morse.

Let us look at the consequences of this view of life in the master-mind of Froebel. Deriving all things from an all-embracing unity, which he calls God, he holds that "it is the special destiny and life-work of all things to unfold (or evolve) their inner essence, to reveal the divinity that is in them." This implies evolution, the development of Pestalozzi intensified, made more living, as it were, by a clear and distinct conception that it is not merely growth of strength through exercise, but development, from within outward, of an in-born tendency, pervading the whole being, toward an infinite ideal that leads ever upward.

In man, as an intelligent being, this special destiny and life-work is exalted by the demand that he "is to become clearly conscious of his essence, his destiny and life-work, and to accomplish it in perfect spontaneity and freedom;" and it is made the business of education to secure this. While, therefore, with Pestalozzi, he looks upon activity on the part of the child as the essential condition of its evolution, Froebel labors steadily and effectually to make this evolution free and spontaneous, to arouse that *voluntary* activity which alone deserves the name *self-activity*. Pestalozzi induces the child to do what he wants it to do, in the way that he deems best, and with an aim which he alone can comprehend; Froebel, on the other hand, teaches the child to do effectually what it wants to do, in a way that seems agreeable to the child, and with aims fully its own,—taking care, in a chiefly guarding and guiding activity, directed mainly to his example and the suggestive influences of surroundings, that these aims and purposes lie in the direction of his divine ideal.

This protects him effectually against cramming, against which Pestalozzianism has proved inefficient even in the work of its founder. It is true, it must be admitted that there are also many so-called kindergartens, labelled Froebelian, in which cramming of the worst sort is practised; but this can be ascribed neither to Froebel's doctrine nor to his example. The persons in charge of these kindergartens either have had no opportunity to learn more than the merest outside of his work, or have failed in their apprehension of his teachings: they are, if they are earnest in their work—still struggling towards Pestalozzi, or entangled in the contradictions between aim and execution which his name implies.