

methods of scientific study to politics. It arose in South Africa, as the outcome of the accomplishment of South African Union. The South African had found himself driven to grapple with the problem of Union, because so long as he was a citizen of the Transvaal or Cape Colony only, he found himself impotent to deal with the common affairs of South Africa, by the wise and unwise handling of which he was himself vitally affected. No sooner, however, had he created a South African Parliament and become a true South African citizen, than he found himself in a precisely similar difficulty so far as Imperial affairs were concerned. Events, then recent, had proved to him clearly enough that Imperial policy, as being concerned with peace and war, was a matter vitally affecting himself. Yet he had no sort of effective voice in determining that policy, nor did the Imperial constitution as then existing appear to offer any hope of his ever acquiring a voice in determining it. Moreover, a further question was manifest to those who had had experience of the inexorable logic of war. They were citizens of South Africa. They were also citizens of the Empire. If the claims of the two came into conflict how were they to be reconciled, and, if they could not be reconciled, which had first call on their allegiance? In view of the recent "Uitlander" experience, these questions seemed to them not academic in their nature, but of urgent practical importance. To "wait and see" was to give a blank cheque upon their lives and resources to the British Ministry—an indefinite liability, the reality and magnitude of which was certain to be disclosed by the next war. And it might also mean the sudden forcing upon them of a choice between allegiance to South Africa and to the Empire—through the pursuit, for instance, of a policy by the British Government which either ignored South African interests, or was misunderstood in South Africa because there was no effective constitutional link between the two. It was clear that these problems, in a form equally or even more acute, faced the people of all the other Dominions. It was in order to throw light on these problems, and to ascertain whether they were insoluble, and if not, what were the conditions of their solution, that an organized enquiry was set on foot.

The basis of the enquiry was that its members were agreed upon one thing only—namely, that there was an Imperial problem, and that it was a primary duty of such responsible citizens as could find the time for serious study to endeavour to state the

complexity, based upon knowledge of the peculiar conditions and needs of every part of the Empire and representative of all sections of opinion within it. Accordingly they have, wherever possible, included within each group members belonging to all local parties, and holding all shades of Imperialist and anti-Imperialist opinion. There has been no secrecy about their proceedings, but neither has publicity been sought. The primary object of enquiry has been to bring to bear upon the greatest of all our political problems the methods of scientific investigation characteristic of a Royal Commission, for the benefit, first, of the members of the groups themselves, and, after them, of the public at large.

At an early stage of the enquiry it became evident that the first necessity was to decide what citizenship, or, in other words, what membership of a State, implied. It was impossible to decide whether citizenship of the Empire was different from citizenship of the United Kingdom, or of Canada, or of Australia, and if so in what respects, and how the two were to be reconciled, until the nature of a State and of the obligations which citizenship imposes upon the individual had been determined.

The State is the primary and fundamental form of association among men, that association which includes and makes possible every other form of association, whether it be a limited liability company, a trades union, or a municipal or county government. The essential nature of citizenship is described in The Commonwealth of Nations as follows: "The quickening principle of a State is a sense of devotion, an adequate recognition somewhere in the minds of its subjects that their own interests are subordinate to those of the State. The bond which unites them and constitutes them collectively as a State is, to use the words of Lincoln, in the nature of dedication. Its validity, like that of the marriage tie, is at root not contractual but sacramental. Its foundation is not self-interest, but rather some sense of obligation, however conceived, which is strong enough to overmaster self-interest." It is obligation, not privilege, duties, and not rights, which lie at the root of citizenship, and which, in consequence, are the foundations upon which every healthy and progressive State must build its communal life. This obligation, however, is not owed to a monarch or to an abstraction labelled "the State," as is the Prussian view. It is owed to the whole body of one's fellow-citizens, organized as a community in obedience to law.

The State is the word we use to denote this fundamental form of human association, that which is based upon the irrevocable dedication of the members to one another for the practical conduct of social life. The common view that the State has the right to dispose of the life and property of its citizens obscures somewhat the essential truth that it is not the rights of the community over the individual, but the unlimited duty owed by the citizen to his fellows, which is the foundation of citizenship. Citizenship is at bottom recognition of the fact that men have to live in society, and that the primary duty of the individual to his neighbours is to obey those laws which they together drew up for the guidance of the communal life, and which secure to the individual his rights, prescribe his duties, and protect all the members of the State from injustice and wrong, until he can persuade his fellow-citizens to amend them. There may be times when the citizen feels bound to resist an unjust law, or the wrongful exercise of the authority of the State, by the government of the day. But circumstances can never arise which release him from his obligations to his fellow-citizens themselves, or entitle him to put personal or sectional interests before the welfare of the whole, or which justify him in repudiating his obligation to comply with the general body of laws which represent the agreement of the community as to the conditions under which they can best and most fairly conduct their common life. This ultimate truth is not so apparent to-day as it ought to be, because, the world being still divided into separate sovereign States, citizens can migrate from one State to another. But, even so, the individual can get rid of his obligation to obey the laws of one State only by undertaking a similar obligation in another. The "cityless" man, or the "Stateless" man is an outlaw. The inescapable obligation of citizenship will only become plain when all mankind is united in one world State.

From this examination of the nature of citizenship and of the State it follows that no one can be a citizen of two States at the same time. For if the laws of two sovereign communities require an individual to act in conflicting ways, he has to choose between the two. He has to repudiate allegiance to one State or the other, because he cannot obey the laws of both. This fact, owing to the huge migration from

Europe in recent years, has not always been clearly understood. But, if there were any doubt on the subject, it has been dispelled by the recent internment as enemy aliens in all belligerent countries of thousands of people who, though long residents in these countries, had never formally repudiated their old allegiance and taken on in its place the obligations of citizenship in their new homes by a formal act of naturalization. The war, indeed, has abundantly demonstrated the searching and inexorable nature of the obligations of citizenship.

It has also brought out the fundamental importance of the question which lay at the root of The Round Table enquiry. If the primary duty of the individual is to obey the laws of the sovereign community to which he belongs, it is of paramount importance that he should know which State it is to which he actually belongs. In the case of the British citizen, is it to the British Empire, or to his national



AMERICA'S ARMY AND NAVY.

American Parents: "Why is everybody laughing at our children?"

—Life, New York.



THE LONE BALKAN FOX.

A wily fox one day lost his tail in a German promise trap. He immediately endeavoured to induce the other Balkan foxes to cut off their tails. "No," replied the others, "you may take the consequences of your own foolishness, but we will not part with our tails to keep you company in your misery. The Allies and victory for ours." And so they left him to bewail his loss.

—(After Aesop) in the Montreal Star.

problem and the conditions of its solution, and to make them available for their fellow-countrymen. For that reason the groups of students which came to be known by the name of this Review, and which by degrees spread over the British Isles, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, and Egypt, have never been propagandist associations. They have never had an Imperial policy. Their sole purpose has been to conduct an investigation of the Imperial problem on a scale commensurate with its

community within it, that his primary allegiance is owed? In other words, is the Empire one State or is it an association of States? If the laws and commands of the Imperial Legislature and of the Canadian, Australian, and other national Legislatures conflict, which is he to obey?

It is quite clear that in constitutional theory and in fact the Empire to-day is one State. It is one State because, when it is declared to be at war by the Imperial Government, all its citizens are at war; because the national constitutions of the several parts are derived from the sovereign Imperial Parliament, which, in theory, has the power to revoke or amend them at will; and because, if any self-governing community determined to pursue in regard to foreign nations in some matter of vital importance a course which was inconsistent with the deliberate policy of the Imperial Cabinet or the laws of the Imperial Parliament, it would find that it could do so only by severing its connection with the British Empire—a severance which would be announced either by its own Government or by the Imperial Government as the only method by which the latter could repudiate responsibility for the consequences of its conduct. If, therefore, a conflict arose between the Imperial Government and the Government of any self-governing part, the duty of the citizen to-day would clearly be to obey the Imperial rather than the national command. From the constitutional point of view there is not the slightest doubt that that is the position to-day. To put it in its most familiar form, every British subject's allegiance is to the King.

Yet it is obvious that constitutional theory, if it were brought to the test, would not wholly coincide with practical fact.

It is not difficult to see what the root of the trouble is. It consists in the fact that the British Commonwealth to-day is not a true commonwealth, it is an English Empire, or rather an Empire governed by the United Kingdom. Its common affairs are controlled solely by the people of the British Isles, and the Cabinet and Parliament through which they control them is the same Cabinet and Parliament which is responsible for the Dominion affairs of the United Kingdom. The peoples of the Dominion, on the other hand, have liabilities from Imperial policy, but they have a share neither in the control over nor in the responsibility for that policy. The Imperial con-