

that adequate notice of any changes in the disposition or capabilities of these forces will be obtained.

I should like now to relate the question of the future of NORAD and of the NORAD Agreement to the broader strategic considerations I have just outlined.

It is well known that the relative importance of the long-range bomber as a component of the Soviet strategic forces has steadily declined as the Soviet Union has built up its intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces. It is probably also true that the long-range bomber force is now the least important of the three major components of the Soviet strategic forces, and certainly, for employment in a first strike, the least effective of these components.

The relative decline in the strategic value of the long-range bomber is not the result of accident. It is the product of three factors: the bomber, when on the ground, is difficult to protect and is therefore vulnerable to an opponent's missile attack; the bomber, by comparison with a ballistic missile, takes a long time to reach its target and therefore allows considerably more time in which to obtain warning of attack; and, finally, the bomber, when in the air, is far more vulnerable than missiles to interception and destruction by defensive forces.

As General Lane told you, we now believe that, if the Soviet Union were to decide to launch a nuclear attack on North America and to employ bombers in such an attack, the bombers would be launched at the same time as the ICBMs, or subsequently, against targets which might have survived the initial missile attack. I think we should recognize that, if so employed, the bombers could add substantial to the total of destruction and casualties, but would nevertheless have little influence on the basic strategic outcome. By the time the bombers reached their targets, the retaliatory attack would, in all probability, have occurred.

My Department has, as you will be aware, recently carried out a complete review of our air-defence policy. In this review, we have had to recognize that the bomber, *if it could reach its target undetected and unopposed*, would be a very effective weapon against United States land-based missile forces and strategic bomber forces and could seriously reduce United States retaliatory capabilities. We have concluded that effective early-warning systems, able to detect the approach of bombers well away from their targets, are the main requirement to deter the Soviet Union from using them effectively in a first-strike attack on the United States retaliatory forces. As long as such effective early warning is available as NORAD provides through the Dew line and Pine Tree radar systems, bombers could not be launched by the Soviet Union ahead of missiles in a co-ordinated attack without running the serious risk of indicating an intention to attack well before the missiles were launched and inviting United States pre-emption of the missile attack.

We have also concluded that to rely at this time on warning alone to deter bomber attack would introduce an undesirable element of instability into the present strategic system. Bombers are large aircraft which, in international airspace, are not readily distinguishable from the host of other large aircraft regularly plying the international airways. Their crews must be trained in and practice their missions in peacetime, and, in the course of such exercises, foreign bombers from time to time approach North America to probe the alertness of the defences. Effective early warning requires a capability not only to detect such aircraft through radar but to carry out positive identification as well.