

not yet accomplished. She reigns throughout the world by her reason, after having ceased to reign by her authority." Chancellor Kent might have added to his catalogue, the Cape of Good Hope, and British Guiana, where the Roman-Dutch Law prevails.

Pothier devoted more than twelve years of his wonderfully laborious life to his re-arrangement of Justinian's Pandects. The preface to that great work, though it appears under Pothier's name, was written by his friend and collaborateur, M. de Guienne. It contains an admirable vindication of the study of the Roman Law, as forming a necessary part of a French lawyer's education. The writer points out that little of value would be left of the Droit Civil, if we were to take away that which it has borrowed from the Roman system. And he goes on to say, that it is impossible properly to understand the rules of the French Law, without considering the source from which they are derived, and the manner in which they have been gradually developed. His logical and masterly statement is expressed in that fluent if not always strictly classical Latin, which was becoming a rare accomplishment in the middle of the 18th century. Pothier himself must have been among the last of the great lawyers, who not only wrote Latin gracefully and easily, but was able to converse in that language. His friend, Le Trosne, tells us that he accompanied Pothier on a journey to Rouen and Havre, which was almost the only occasion on which Pothier was induced to tear himself from his books. The two friends conversed in Latin nearly all the time. No doubt, the comparative neglect of the Roman Law in the present day is in part due to the loss of any such familiarity with the language in which it is written.

There is one subject that forms part of the legal programme in many Universities, which is not covered in the outline I have just given. I refer to Natural Law, or *Naturrecht*, for the true home of this study is in Germany, and it has never led more than a somewhat sickly and precarious existence in other countries. It is possible, no doubt, to present in an interesting way, philosophical or metaphysical considerations as to the ultimate basis of law. I feel almost a sense of ingratitude in speaking with any disrespect of this subject, when I remember the stimulating and ingenious prelections of the late Professor Lorimer, of Edinburgh, which I had the advantage of hearing. But as one may see things very plainly without understanding thoroughly the nature of sensation or perception, so one may be a very good lawyer, without having