

A. D.
1758.

commanding his men to attack such a fortified camp without cannon, when he had a sufficient train with him for the service? Who can commend his care of himself on such a desperate service; not advancing the whole time farther than the mills, two miles from the seat of action; when his presence was necessary with his army? Who can give a solid reason for his flying, when there was no enemy in a condition to pursue: and re-embarking an army of 14,000 effective men, well provided with all necessaries for support, defence, and to return to the attack of Ticonderoga, with a view of success, by a proper use of the force under his command, against an enemy, that was not above 3000 strong, and from whom both a retreat and succours might have been easily cut off? An officer employed in this expedition writes, "Having secured the advanced posts, after the retreat, the remainder of the army might have kept possession of the mills; a post which is, perhaps, as advantageously situated, and as strongly fortified by nature, as any in the universe. But what was most surprizing, the whole army was ordered to embark, 30 men in each batteau, and to retire to Fort William Henry, after having gained and given up as many advantages in four days, as, perhaps, ever happened, since war has been known. The retreat was so precipitate, that great quantities of intrenching tools, several batteau loads of provisions and other things were left behind. All strong indications of an unaccountable panic. Yet the Provincial troops were still in

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