

the cease-fire by appropriate instructions to their forces, they have . . . failed to carry through a discipline sufficiently firm to forestall incidents which, step by step, must necessarily undermine the cease-fire . . . The present state of affairs is deeply disturbing . . . There is a permanent risk that the incidents (may) release a chain of events . . . Apart from legal considerations this fact in itself fully justifies the stand of the Security Council on *all* acts of violence including those which reflect a policy of retaliation."

Conditions along the armistice line about the Gaza strip had improved for some weeks as a result of the special cease-fire assurances given by the parties to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General regretted to have to report their deterioration during the summer, however. In his report of September 12, 1956 he observed that "the quiet prevailing after the agreements on the cease-fire arrangements offered (the parties) unique possibilities" for starting "a chain of reactions in a positive direction. However . . . none of the parties concerned has used the opportunities thus offered . . . developments have indicated that the will to establish peaceful conditions had not grown strong enough for any of those concerned to take the risks necessary for a use of existing opportunities."

Six weeks later, on October 29, Israel invaded Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula and on November 2 took control of the Gaza strip. The Security Council met on October 30 to deal with the emergency, but a United States draft resolution calling on Israel to withdraw to the armistice line was vetoed by France and the United Kingdom. A Yugoslav draft resolution was then adopted referring the Middle East question to the General Assembly under procedures made available in the Assembly's "uniting for peace" resolution of November 3, 1950. In a series of six resolutions adopted on November 2, 4, 7 and 24, 1956 and January 19 and February 2, 1957 the General Assembly called on Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory. A draft resolution sponsored by six African and Asian states condemning Israel for its non-compliance with the above resolutions and calling upon "all states to deny all military, economic or financial assistance and facilities to Israel in view of its continued defiance of the aforementioned resolutions" was submitted to the General Assembly on February 23 but was not put to the vote in view of indications that Israel might soon withdraw its forces from the Gaza strip and from the only position it still occupied in the Sinai

Peninsula, opposite the Straits of Tiran. On March 1 Israel's Foreign Minister announced to the General Assembly that "full and prompt withdrawal" would take place and listed certain assumptions on which Israel's decision had been based. The withdrawal was completed on March 8, 1957.

Meanwhile on the basis of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on November 4, 7 and 24, 1956 a United Nations Emergency Force under the command of Major General E. L. M. Burns had been organized "to secure and supervise cessation of hostilities". Advance units arrived in Egypt on November 15. The force moved gradually across the Sinai Peninsula as Israeli units withdrew and in the first week of March UNEF replaced Israeli forces at the Straits of Tiran and in the Gaza strip.

3. (a) The restrictions began during the hostilities before the creation of the State of Israel, when Egypt by military proclamations of March 15 and 19, 1948 made liable to confiscation any merchandise consigned to the mandated territory of Palestine. After Israel was established on May 15, 1948 as an independent state the measures were no longer applied against all of Palestine but only against the area of Palestine occupied by Israel. The contraband regulations were altered from time to time and in practice on occasions extended well beyond the basic contraband list of February 9, 1950, which had included arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical substances for military purposes, appliances for chemical warfare, fuels including oil, warships and military aircraft and their component parts, tanks, armoured cars, gold, silver and means of payment.

Israel first referred the matter to the Security Council in October 1950. On this occasion the Security Council asked that an effort should be made to resolve the difficulty with the aid of machinery made available under the armistice agreement. This was attempted, but on appeal from the Mixed Armistice Commission to the Special Committee, for which provision was made in Article X of the armistice agreement, the Mixed Armistice Commission was eventually found to lack competence in the matter because it could deal only with hostile acts committed by military or para-military forces, whereas in this case civilian officials were putting the Egyptian regulations into effect. The Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who was also Chairman of the Special Committee, expressed, however, his own belief that "the action of the Egyptian authorities is . . . entirely contrary to the spirit of the General Armistice Agreement and does, in fact, jeopardize its effective functioning." In his